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Abstract 
 
 Political instability impedes financial development and is a primary determinant of differences in financial 
development around the world. Four conventional measures of national political instability — Alesina and Perotti’s 
(1996) well-known index of instability, a subsequent index derived from Banks’ (2005) work, and two indices of 
managerial perceptions of nation-by-nation political instability — persistently predict a wide range of national 
financial development outcomes for recent decades. These results are robust to other factors prominent in the 
literature in the past decade and hold for a range of key financial outcomes for data over all available years and all 
available countries over several decades. Political instability’s significance is time consistent back to the 1960’s, the 
period when the key data becomes available, robust in both country fixed-effects and instrumental variable 
regressions, and consistent across multiple measures of instability and of financial development. Overall, the results 
indicate the existence of an important channel running from political instability, principally in nondemocratic 
settings, to financial backwardness. The robust significance of that channel extends existing work demonstrating the 
importance of political economy explanations for financial development and financial backwardness.  It should help 
to better understand what policies will work for financial development, because political instability has causes, cures, 
and effects quite distinct from those of many of the key institutions most studied in the past decade as explaining 
financial backwardness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Financial development is now widely seen as necessary or useful to propel economic growth, to 
create wealth, and to develop a nation (Levine (1997); King and Levine (1993); Sylla et al. (1999); Rajan 
and Zingales (1998, 2003, 2003b); Mishkin (2006: 25)). This view has become conventional wisdom and 
has induced international agencies and development officials to bolster financial markets by strengthening 
their supporting institutions, particularly via institutions of investor protection, in the hope that economic 
development will quickly follow, as the World Bank’s (2006) report reflects. 
Despite efforts to develop finance and its associated institutions, financial development around the 
world has been uneven, with prominent explanations for its variation tied to a nation’s corporate and 
securities law institutions, its legal origin, its trade openness, and its legacy of colonial endowments. 
Other factors could also explain differences in financial development. Findings in adjacent disciplines 
suggest that political instability strongly affects overall economic development. Perhaps it affects 
financial development as well and does so independently of its effect on overall economic development. 
Hence, there is reason to search for other important determinants of, and impediments to, financial 
development. We do so here, finding that a nation’s political stability should be added to our 
understanding of the key determinants of modern financial development. The first political instability 
indicator used here is derived not from the advanced nations’ shifting coalitions, Arrow-type policy 
cycling, or swings in elections, governments, or policy, but instead derives from the severe, sharp disorder 
that nations, usually less developed nondemocratic ones, suffer via military coups, irregular changes in 
government, and political violence. The second derives from indicators of government crisis. The third 
and fourth are constructed from managerial perceptions of national political instability. Such instability 
quite plausibly impedes a nation from building institutions, such as investor protection, that support 2                                  
finance or undermines such institutions’ effectiveness even if built. Severe instability such as that 
measured by the first two indices has been frequent in the past four decades. Cross-country variation in 
the severity of political disorder powerfully explains much of the variation in financial outcomes around 
the world in the past forty years. It is robust to prevailing explanations, some of which persist as 
significant and some of which do not.  
A widespread view in the law and finance literature, a view to which we subscribe, sees investor 
protection institutions to be critical to financial development, as the text and citations below show. E,g., 
La Porta et al. (1998); Dyck and Zingales (2004). But what induces one nation to build adequate investor 
protection institutions and another not to? Much current thinking in finance looks to a combination of 
legal origin, trade openness, colonial conditions, and the related and resultant institutions, as the important 
channels to investor protection. (We discuss this literature below.) Partly as a result of these influential 
views, the policy advice the World Bank and others give to developing countries focuses foremost on the 
institutions among these causal factors that can be altered quickly, such as investor protection rules and 
corporate codes of conduct (World Bank (2006)). Investor protection in this literature is seen as being an 
institutional choice, one implemented via courts, rules, and regulators.  
We add to this work. Primary institutions of investor protection, such as courts, legal rules, and 
regulators, cannot function well in unstable political environments and this inability may be a critical 
channel connecting political instability to financial backwardness. A country’s capacity and willingness to 
build and maintain investor protection, as well as other property protection, institutions depend largely on 
its relative political stability. Unstable polities cannot, or will not, reliably protect investors. This channel 
to financial backwardness leads back to more. When we observe that a dominant  root of political 
instability uncovered in the political economy literature in weak democracies is the severity of economic 
inequality, we unearth a deeper explanation for a polity’s  incapacity and unwillingness to protect 
investors, one that becomes clear as the pieces are placed next to one another:  when inequality is severe, 
investor protection protects favored strata in those unstable nations. But protecting those favored strata is 
something an unstable polity mired in severe inequality cannot do easily. We present strong evidence for                          3 
this political economy characteristic being a major channel explaining financial backwardness, one that 
could explain why some nations cannot, or will not, build the needed institutions and why they work 
badly in some nations even when built. 
If separate channels run through or from political instability and exercise a first-order impact on 
financial development, then differently prioritized policy considerations could come into play. If other 
sources of political instability are not associated with the currently-prominent channels, such as building 
up investor protection (or pulling down trade barriers), then further protecting investors (or further 
opening up trade) could fail to sufficiently foster finance. Although they are policies that could improve 
economic conditions, in an unstable polity they could fail to have their intended effect. Such efforts could 
fail because the independently unstable polity could undo whatever benefits better investor protection 
provided in developing finance. We seek in this article to understand whether this independence is 
plausible, conclude that it is, and raise the question as to whether its plausibility helps to explain why 
finance has progressed unevenly around the world.  
Conventional policy advice could backfire if independent channels run from political instability to 
financial backwardness, because an investor-protection-oriented policy focus could fail if other political 
foundations must be built simultaneously. That result could sour policy-makers on protection tools, when 
they are in fact necessary, just not sufficient. Indeed, in some national settings in the developing world, 
further protecting investors could more severely destabilize an already unstable polity. Given Alesina and 
Perotti’s (1996) finding that severe economic inequality is the key determinant of political instability and 
the likelihood that investor protection would protect the most favored elements in such polities, this risk 
of backfire, although speculative, is plausible. More specifically, investor protection may fail to function 
well in polities that fail to first develop sufficient equality, such as that of a broad, property-owning 
middle-class.  
Causality considerations and the possibility of collinearity are relevant but do not erase the lines 
running from political instability. First, instability is not strongly collinear with prior explanatory 
variables. Second, variance inflation factor analysis shows that no significant multicollinearity influences 4                                  
the models. Third, to anchor causality as running from instability to financial outcomes, we deploy a two-
stage instrumental variable model. Key institutions needed for basic financial development would 
function poorly in a severely unstable polity, making it odd if finance developed strongly while the polity 
was unstable and if financial development thereafter stabilized that polity. Both the two-stage evidence 
and prior law and finance theory fit best with a key causal channel running from political instability to 
financial backwardness. 
Simply showing that political instability diminished financial development would be secondary if 
instability’s effect on finance were only channeled through its effect on economic development. But it 
appears not to be so limited: when we control for economic development, via both the log of per capita 
GDP and GDP growth rates, political instability significance persists in our models, statistically and 
economically. Four decades of year-by-year regressions and country fixed-effects regressions show a 
regular and powerful correlation between political stability and strong financial development on the one 
hand and political instability and weak financial development on the other. Results are similar for political 
instability’s association with weak financial outcomes in the less developed, non-OECD subsample. 
Our work here relates to La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2008) in searching for the bases for financial 
development, although we find current political instability to explain financial development more 
powerfully than historical legal origin. It relates to Rajan and Zingales (2003, 2003b) in examining 
political economy determinants of financial markets. They examine how industrial elites, sometimes in 
alliance with poorer groups, benefit from financial repression that undermines potential competitors, 
while we focus on how conflict between the elites and others, when severe enough, destabilizes a polity 
and undermines financial development. It relates to Alesina and Perotti (1996) in that it finds political 
instability to be a primary determinant of an economic outcome. It complements work offering political 
economy explanations for finance, such as that of Rajan and Zingales (2003), Pagano and Volpin (2005), 
Perotti and von Thadden (2006), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Finally, this article relates to 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) in finding inequality, political instability, and institutional quality 
interacting to produce economic outcomes, in our case financial backwardness.                           5 
The concept here is both new and old. It is new because we focus more on inequality-induced 
political variation as impeding financial development and less on the last decade’s ideas as to the 
important institutional foundations for financial development. It is old, because the basic concepts go 
back through the ages, finding vivid expression in Aristotle’s Politics: “the equalization of property … 
tend[s] to prevent the citizens from quarreling” (Aristotle (1986: 45, Bk II, Sec. VII). But simply striving 
for equality in unequal settings is no sure cure, as the striving by itself creates the very conflict that the 
polity needs to avoid (id: 142-144, Bk V, ch. 1.), yielding no easy recipe for stability. Overall, says 
Aristotle, “[i]t is ever best to live where equality prevails” (id: 158, Bk V, ch. VII), but not where it does 
not already exist and not where the citizenry are striving for it.  
We conclude by trying to link two major literatures: an economics literature that sees political 
instability as strongly impeding economic development (e.g., Alesina and Perotti (1996); Rodrik (1999)) 
and a finance literature that sees financial development as strongly propelling economic development. A 
primary channel from political stability to economic development could well run through financial 
development. If so, much is at stake both intellectually and in policy terms in knowing whether political 
instability, which could depend on rough economic equality and the breadth of a property-owning middle 
class, is a primary determinant of financial backwardness. Although building such a foundation is far 
more difficult than building the formal institutions of investor protection and is beyond the remit of the 
development agencies, we outline below how further work can integrate the finding into policy.  
I. EXPLAINING FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Several explanations have become prominent in explaining financial development: legal origin, 
colonial endowments, trade openness, and political economy configurations arising from colonial 
endowments. Common law systems are seen as particularly adept at protecting investors with well-
developed legal remedies, while civil law nations, particularly French civil law nations, do not, La Porta 
et al. (1997, 1998) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2001) report. Rajan and Zingales (2003) look 
at incumbent interests who seek to thwart upstarts by denying them financial opportunities. But when the 6                                  
nations’ trade channels are open, the incumbents need new financing as well, so they cease opposing 
financial development. Stulz and Williamson (2003) focus on cultural characteristics. Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002: 88) develop a colonial endowments 
view, that those colonies that developed via extractive industries or plantation agriculture run by a small, 
elite group of colonizers using a large, unskilled labor force tended to have weak property rights. In 
contrast, colonies settled mostly by immigrants from the mother country developed stronger property 
rights, stronger educational traditions, and stronger financial and economic development. Relative 
democratic political instability should be added as a central consideration and, as our results show, is 
robust to the current explanations for differences in financial development, although we confirm the 
significance of several of the prominent ones.  
Consider extreme instability, such as from insurrection, severe domestic violence, assassination, or 
a destructive civil war. Lindgren (2005: 10-12) reports: “[t]oday most armed conflicts are civil wars… . 
They accounted for 77% of armed conflicts [during the years] 1989─2003.” Such instability and conflict 
divert the attention of public officials; capital flees the country; skilled people emigrate; and the base for 
economic and financial development weakens. Entrepreneurs who remain are unwilling to invest in 
physical assets and need less finance. “In this risky environment many entrepreneurs … engage [only] in 
economic pursuits that yield fast and large returns … ” Lindgren (2005: 5) states. Short-term investments 
need less sophisticated capital market institutions than long-term investments. Unstable governments can 
provide and maintain the machinery of contract enforcement and property protection only with difficulty. 
Governmental macro- and financial policies and opportunities weaken.
1  
Two observations are worth keeping in mind. First, the incidence of serious, violent political 
instability has simply not been small. Fifty-seven countries had three or more instances of severe political 
instability, even short of civil war, since the 1980s, Banks (2005) reports. Second, there is a simple and 
                                                           
1 Acemoglu et al. (2003) links poor macroeconomic policy to a weak institutional environment. Outreville (1999), in an 
unpublished paper, presents cross-sectional results linking Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) instability index to the size of the money 
supply (M2). His result was limited to the late 1980s and did not control for legal institutions, trade openness, or colonial 
conditions, but is encouraging for our study.  
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strong association between political instability and financial outcomes, one that Figure 1 illustrates. 
Hence, there is reason to measure modern political instability, see if it predicts financial outcomes, and 
determine its robustness to alternative explanations for the world’s variation in financial development. 
II. DATA DESCRIPTION 
We measure political instability’s effects on financial markets across time and across nations. To 
do so, we need measures of political stability and measures of financial market outcomes. Four major 
indices of political stability are available. One is from Alesina and Perotti (1996), another from Banks 
(2005). For more recent years, a third is available from the Lausanne-based IMD (International Institute 
of Managerial Development) World Competitiveness Yearbook (1999-2004) and a fourth from the World 
Economic Forum. Four instability indices are used not just to see if the results persist over different 
measures, but because the indices cover different time periods and we want to see if our results persist 
over time. There are multiple ways to measure financial development, so we use multiple indicators. The 
results prevail across the multiple indicators. 
A. Measures of Political Stability 
The first instability measure here is Alesina and Perotti’s (1996: 1207-1208) sociopolitical 
instability (SPI) index, which measures the average political instability by country for 1960-1982. Using 
principal component analysis, they construct their index from data on a nation’s number of politically-
motivated assassinations, the number of people killed in domestic mass violence (as a percentage of the 
nation’s total population), the number of successful and attempted coups, and a categorical variable for 
whether the nation is a democracy or a dictatorship. Because the index uses deep disruptions — such as 
military coups and political assassinations — simple electoral change, even if frequent and sharp, does 
not count as unstable; violent change, even if infrequent, does. Because they weight the index with a 
categorical indicator of democracy, their index is not purely one of political instability in its intuitive 
sense. Pinochet’s Chile, for example, would be stable in an intuitive sense, but, due to the democracy 
measure and the prevalence of violence, it is not coded as highly stable in the Alesina-Perotti index. 8                                  
(Perhaps the categorical democracy variable captures some expected probability of future disruptions.) As 
such, the index could be recast as one of democratic political regularity. Regardless, this has been a 
respected and widely used measure ― cited well over 100 times in the academic literature ― of political 
instability, or as we might rename it, of democratic political regularity. 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that the SPI index predicted total public and private sector 
investment by country during the years 1960─1985 and we follow them in testing whether the SPI index 
predicts private debt and equity market development. However, the data from which Alesina and Perotti 
derive their index was only collected through 1982 (Taylor and Jodice (1983)).
2 Accordingly, it is of 
limited use for assessing the political instability’s potential impact in more recent years.  Because of this 
limit to the index, and so as not to rely on just one measure of political crisis, we build our own 
subsequent index with the Cross-National Time Series (CNTS) database that Banks (2005) compiled of 
later political instability. This database, an earlier version of which served as the basis of Barro-Lee’s 
(1994) political instability measures, has instability data running through 2003. We focus on its 
“government crisis” variable and, to better see whether past instability has continuing effect, we generate 
a moving index of political instability.
3 We take data on government crises by year for each country and 
use a 1 percent decay rate for assessing the impact of past government crises over the prior 30-year 
period. To check the robustness of the 1 percent decay rate, we ran the same tests with a 5 percent and a 
10 percent decay rate with varying time periods. Results with these were similar to those with the 1 
percent rate. 
A third measure of political instability comes from IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(WCY). Since 1999, the WCY reported how several thousand executives around the world ranked 
political instability country-by-country, with the surveyed executives asked to rate on a scale of 0-10 the 
                                                           
2 We reconstructed and confirmed the Alesina-Perotti index from its components; the reconstruction, with the slightly varying 
index for democracy available to us, had a correlation approaching 1.00. 
3 Because the most serious forms of political violence (as shown both in Banks’ data and illustrated in Figures 4 and 5) declined 
in recent years, Banks’ government crisis variable stood out as plausibly explaining the instability component to recent financial 
development in the developing world. It included major eruptions of major political violence up to but not including coups. In the post-
1980 environment, the incidence of coups and civil wars declined, resulting in low variation in these variables such that they no longer                          9 
extent to which they agree with the statement that, for their home country, “the risk of political instability 
is very low.” The IMD’s annual results were averaged over the 1999-2003 and 1999-2004 periods that 
overlap with our financial development indicators. The IMD index has the advantages of measuring 
business world actors’ perceptions of political instability and of focusing on recent years. We also use a 
similar executive survey from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, which asks 
executives in a country the likelihood of legal and political stability over the subsequent five years.  
B. Measures of Financial Outcomes  
For outcomes, the principal ones used are stock market depth and banking breadth, as measured by 
stock market capitalization/GDP and bank loans/GDP, two core indicators of a nation’s financial depth. 
Perhaps because they are core indicators, better data is available for more countries and more years than 
for other indicators. 
For debt markets, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) data on the amount of 
bank credit to the private sector divided by GDP is the starting measure. We also use a closely related 
WDI measure of the total amount of credit received by the private sector divided by GDP. Both measures 
are available in the WDI June 2006 release for years 1965─2004. Next, from a 2006 update of a publicly 
available database that Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000) compiled, we use their variable for the 
size of the private bond market divided by GDP, as well as their variable for the size of the public bond 
market divided by GDP.
4 Those last two variables are available for years 1990-2003.  
For equity markets, we first focus on stock market capitalization divided by GDP and the number 
of listed firms per thousands in population, two equity market variables available from WDI for years 
1988─2004. Next, from the 2006 release of the database Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000) 
compiled, we use their coding of the variable for stock market capitalization divided by GDP. The latter 
data is available for a larger number of years (1976─2003), allowing us to see whether the effects persist 
year-by-year over more than a quarter of a century. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
explained differences in financial development. However, severe political instability up to but not including coups and civil wars 
continued to be widespread and variation on this measure proved highly significant in explaining ongoing equity market development.  10                                  
For the other independent variables and for the controls, we use legal origin, trade openness, 
latitude, governmental structure, and per capita income. Table 1 lists the variables and their sources. 
C. Further Data 
Because we are also although secondarily interested in identifying plausible causes of political 
instability in addition to its effects, we examine income inequality, the variable that Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) use to predict political instability. The relative proportion of national income going to the middle 
class (defined as the third and fourth quintiles) comes from Perotti (1996) for 1960 or the closest annual 
observation available after 1960. We supplement that data with measures of Gini coefficients in the 
WIDER World Income Inequality Database for years 1970-2000.
5 Following the WIDER database 
compilers’ recommendation, we focus on the Gini measures they rated as highest quality and chose those 
observations closest to each decade point (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000).  
Ethnic fractionalization is the most prominent further explanation for political instability, although 
even its explanatory power often comes from how it facilitates economic inequality (by exacerbating a 
dominant group’s propensity to deny wealth to poorer citizens from another ethnic group). We use 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg’s (2003) measures of ethnic fractionalization. 
We follow Rajan and Zingales (2003) in using the measure of natural geographic openness that 
Frankel and Romer (1999) created (and called “constructed trade share”) and that Rajan and Zingales then 
used in the finance literature. We also use other measures of trade openness — [imports plus 
exports]/GDP and [imports plus exports]/GDP instrumented by constructed trade share. (Our political 
instability results below are robust to both, although trade openness is itself typically significant, as in 
Rajan and Zingales (2003).) 
Because some authors believe that close-to-the-equator latitude drove most negative economic 
development outcomes, we add a control for latitude, from You and Khagram (2005) as also used 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 This Year 2006 data release came from http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/Publications.html. 
5 The WIDER database can be accessed at http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.html.                          11 
previously in Treisman (2000). To control for simple wealth effects, we use the annual log of GDP per 
capita in constant U.S. dollars from the World Bank’s Word Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
III. MODELS AND RESULTS 
To begin, banking sector development in 1980, as proxied by bank credit provided to the private 
sector divided by GDP, has a pair-wise correlation with the SPI index of -0.47 (p<.001). A one-standard 
deviation increase in political instability is associated with a 24.3 nominal percentage decrease in banking 
sector development for 1980 — nearly one-half of a standard deviation in the dependent variable. This 
large result reduces to a more plausible level when we add GDP per capita, but stays economically 
substantial. This strong initial result suggested a basis to further investigate political instability as 
impeding financial development. 
To assess the potential impact of political instability on financial development, we go through 
several steps, ranging from tests for time-consistency of instability to models with country fixed effects 
and then to instrumental variable regressions. As a first step, it is critical to test for the time-consistency 
of the variables that might explain financial development. Prior law and finance work has tended to work 
in the cross-section, with a large proportion of documented results taking place for cross-sections in the 
mid- to late-1990s. Rajan and Zingales (2003), however, show that it is imperative to test whether the 
variables of interest have a consistently positive or negative association with the dependent variable over 
time. Hence, we check for the consistency of political instability indicators for every year with available 
data in the past four decades. (The variable of interest meets the first test, that of time-consistency.) 
We next test for endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity as alternative explanations for the 
persistent association between political instability and financial development. To deal with the possibility 
of unobserved heterogeneity, one can use country fixed effects to partial out time-invariant factors. But 
for the early part of our sample time period political instability is highly time-invariant, making country 
fixed effects regressions invalid. However, starting in the late 1970s there is an increasing divergence in 
political instability both around the world and year-by-year. This increase in variation allows us to test for 12                                  
the impact of changes in political instability on financial development, nation-by-nation, via fixed 
country-effects regressions. The results, which are sharp, are presented below in Table 6. Lastly, to 
further deal with endogeneity concerns, we use a set of instrumental variables for political instability in 
Table 8, primarily based on considerations (and instruments) advanced in Alesina and Perotti (1996), 
Engerrman and Sokoloff (2002), and Easterly (2007). Table 9, our last, shows political stability to 
robustly predict financial outcomes using these instruments. 
We first estimate the following OLS: 
    (1) Bank Credit/GDP i  =    0 β + 1 β ∗Political Instability i + 2 β ∗French Civil Law origin i   
+ 3 β ∗Common Law origin i + 4 β ∗Scandinavian Civil Law origin i   
+ 5 β ∗Constructed trade share i + 6 β ∗Log of GDP per capita i + i ε , 
 
where banking sector development for country i is jointly determined by political instability, legal origin, 
constructed trade share, and the log of GDP per capita.  In the unpublished Appendix, we estimate the 
same model, but with private credit/GDP, private bond market capitalization/GDP, and public bond 
market capitalization/GDP as alternative dependent variables. Results show political instability’s strong 
association with all four debt measures.   
Although the source data for the SPI index ends in 1982, we examine whether it predicts debt and 
credit outcomes for the rest of that decade. Its measured impact on bank credit/GDP endures significantly 
until 1988. Overall, it has a negative and largely statistically significant impact on bank credit divided by 
GDP for the years 1965─1988, even when controlling for legal origin, constructed trade share, and GDP 
per capita. (Its measured impact on the alternative variable for private credit/GDP endures significantly 
until 1984.)   
Figure 2 abstracts the results thus far. We test whether political instability severely weakens 
financial development, as seen in channel A. It does, and it does so independently of its tendency to 
weaken the economy overall (which it also seems to do), mapped out via channel B. It also does so 
independently of the legal origins channel — channel C — that has been proposed in the past decade. 
(Below we examine the strength of the channel running from instability to weak finance for reverse                          13 
causation, via a country fixed effects model and an instrumental variables model in the later Tables 6, 8, 
and 9. We also check below for its robustness to economic growth. Instability does well in the fixed 
effects and instrumental variables models and is robust to indicators of economic growth.) 
For stock market capitalization, the results are similar. Table 3 estimates the following OLS 
regression: 
     (2) Stock Market Development i  =    0 β + 1 β ∗Political Instability i + 2 β ∗French Civil Law origin i   
     + 3 β ∗Common Law origin i + 4 β ∗Scandinavian Civil Law origin i  
     + 5 β ∗Constructed trade share i +  6 β ∗Log of GDP per capita i + i ε , 
 
where stock market development for country i is jointly determined by political instability, legal origin, 
constructed trade share, and the log of GDP per capita.  Each panel in Table 3 uses differing measures of 
stock market capitalization, but each points to political instability having a negative and highly significant 
association with stock market capitalization divided by GDP, again while controlling for log GDP per 
capita, origins, and trade. In Table 3, depending on the year, the World Bank’s WDI data on stock market 
capitalization is available for between 41 and 54 countries, a number comparable to that used in prior 
studies that looked at stock market capitalization outcomes. As in Table 2, we present the Table 3 results 
for stock market capitalization year-by-year to examine the relationships for time consistency; the 
coefficient on instability was typically significant.  
The SPI index and its underlying source data end in 1982, rendering the index of limited value in 
examining the relationship between recent political instability and financial development.  Accordingly, 
we also use Banks’ well-known index of political crises, which measures instability in later years. We 
construct a decaying index by using the current year’s indication of instability, adding .99 of the prior 
year’s measure, and then .99
2 of the prior year, and then .99
3 of the year before that, and so on, until the 
Banks data is exhausted; these results are reported in panel B of Table 3. Here too instability is typically 
significant. Decay rates of 5% and 10% produce similar results, as shown in unpublished Appendix.  
We also examined pooled results for both ─ averaging the outcomes for the time invariant SPI 
measure and using year dummies for the time-varying Banks’ measure. Since the year-by-year results 14                                  
typically have a significant coefficient on our measures of political instability, the pooled and averaged 
results yield a highly significant coefficient on the instability variables. But, since time consistency is 
relevant, we present the year-by-year results in Tables 2 and 3.    
Could an omitted variable for latitude have driven our results? Because latitude and GDP per 
capita are highly collinear, we include one at a time and report the results in the Appendix. When 
controlling for latitude, political instability is generally significant in explaining debt market development 
and stock market capitalization divided by GDP. For stock market capitalization, the statistical 
significance of the SPI index also persists for most of the 1988─2004 period that WDI covers. Latitude is 
statistically significant only during a small time-window, 1997─2001.  
To further assess the impact of political instability in nations having differing levels of wealth, 
beyond that handled with the wealth control, we also ran the key tests we report in Tables 2 and 3 by 
dividing the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, to see if the effects were located primarily in 
the non-OECD countries. They were. (The results are reported in the Appendix.) Despite the lower 
number observations by dropping 30 OECD nations, the predictive power of political instability persisted 
and indeed was often stronger in the less rich sub-sample than for the full sample. Variation in instability 
was weaker in predicting financial differences for the richer, OECD nations. But, since most OECD 
nations have been stable in recent years, that result suggests that a nation needs to pass a threshold of 
stability and deep-crisis-avoidance, that many developing nations do not pass it, and that once passed, 
other factors also play an important role in determining financial differences.
6 In Table 4, we examine the 
relationship between changes in political instability and changes in stock market capitalization, by 
estimating the following OLS regression: 
                                                           
6 Because OECD-member countries have been politically stable in recent decades and variation in political instability is 
highest among non-OECD member countries, political instability’s effect on financial development is strongest in non-OECD 
member countries, as can be seen in the Appendix. Still, the strong political instability results were not driven by simple wealth 
differences:  First, we control directly for log GDP per capita in all primary tables and find that political instability was still a 
highly robust determinant of financial development. Second, we show that the results for political instability are significantly 
robust to the use of instruments, as seen in Table 9. Lastly, while the instability effect in OECD nations was not as prevalent as it 
was in non-OECD nations, it nevertheless was present in our contemporary data and was fundamental in earlier eras, such as the 
Great Depression, as Voth (2002) demonstrates, and the 19
th century, as Brown (2006) demonstrates, when instability varied 
more sharply in the wealthy West than it has in recent decades.                          15 
(3) Change in 1990s-era Stock Market Development i  =    0 β + 1 β ∗Change in Political Instability i +    
       2 β ∗Log of GDP per capita in 1990 i + 3 β ∗Constructed trade share i +           
                                   4 β ∗Latitude i + 5 β ∗Increase in 1990s-era Economic Development i +  
                                   6 β ∗Level of Political Instability in 1990 i + i ε , 
 
where the change in 1990s-era stock market development for country i is jointly determined by the 
change in political instability, the log of GDP per capita in 1990, constructed trade share, latitude, the 
increase in 1990-era economic development in that country, and the level of initial political instability in 
1990. Changes in political instability predict changes in stock market capitalization, with controls in place 
for economic growth, trade, and initial starting economic condition. The effect is most pronounced in 
nations that started with high political instability, again suggestive of a threshold effect, with the small 
variation in the developed OECD nations being determinative. 
Because political instability negatively affects economic development generally and weakly 
developing economies have a lower demand for finance, we wanted to assess better the extent to which 
the channel from political stability to financial development ran primarily through economic growth. To 
do so, we re-ran our primary models with not just a control for log GDP/capita but also a control for 
economic growth. (These tables are reproduced at the end of the unpublished appendix.) As before, 
political instability’s significance persisted. In conjunction with the results for the non-OECD sub-sample 
described above, the evidence is suggestive of a separate channel from stability to financial development 
to growth.  
As we have noted, the SPI index measures overall instability for 1960─1982. Many financial 
outcomes we report are for the subsequent quarter-century. But where we have outcome data going back 
before 1982, we use the SPI index to look at those earlier outcomes. We do so for two reasons. One, the 
underlying year-by-year instability measures were highly time-invariant in the first several decades after 
World War II. As a robustness check, we confirm and report in the Appendix that political instability 
from years 1948–1964 (using the primary source data used for Alesina-Perotti’s political instability 16                                  
index) significantly explains financial development in 1965, when their financial data begins. Secondly, 
as the outcome years approach 1982, the issue becomes trivial.
7 
Does variation in political instability after 1982 (when the SPI index ends) continue to predict 
financial market development? To find out, we use additional measures of political instability: the moving 
index of government crises from Banks (2005) and the IMD instability surveys (over 1999─2004). 
Although government crises as measured by Banks (2005) were approximately one-third to one-half as 
frequent in the 1990s as they were in the 1960s and 1970s, the moving index has explanatory power even 
during the 1990s and early 2000s.
8  
After the secular decline in political instability in the 1980s, neither the 1960─1982 SPI nor Banks’ 
Cross-National index predicts debt market development, but variation in lower-grade instability predicts 
equity market development, as each of Table 3’s four panels show. Perhaps debt markets, for reasons 
requiring future research, are less affected by ongoing low-grade political instability than they were by the 
earlier high instability in some nations.
9 Also, because equity investments have a longer horizon than debt 
investments, investors expecting short-term stability while being very uncertain about long-term prospects 
for stability may be more willing to invest in debt and less willing to invest in equity.  
Banks’ Cross-National instability measure is also negatively and often statistically significantly 
related to stock market capitalization. (These results are also robust to using an alternative stock market 
measure: external market capitalization/GDP for 1996-2000, which is the dependent variable La Porta et 
al. (2006) study. We report this result in Table 7.) 
Our other measure of recent political instability also predicts the strength of the primary financial 
outcomes. Annually since 1999, the IMD Survey has had several thousand senior business executives 
around the world rate nations’ political instability. We averaged their reported perceptions. The averages 
                                                           
7 After we present our primary results and robustness tests, we present a two-stage instrumental variables model in Tables 8 and 
9 that indicates that reverse causality is not a significant concern. 
8 The source data for Alesina-Perotti (1996) index was not collected after 1982, barring us from extending the Alesina-Perotti 
measure. But Banks’ Cross-National Time Series database (the basis for Barro-Lee’s well regarded and much-used measures of political 
disorder) goes up through 2003.                          17 
predict stock market capitalization, bank credit, and private credit quite strongly and do so with the 
standard controls in place, as shown in the Appendix. We run similar tests on the World Economic 
Forum’s similar 1997-2000 perception measure. It also robustly and consistently predicts financial 
outcomes. The results are consistent and robust both when we use the survey measure directly and when 
instrumented, as the Appendix reports. 
Each measure of political instability significantly predicts weakness in financial development and 
is quite robust to explanations for financial development that have become prominent in the past decade. 
Do SPI’s components separately predict financial outcomes? The index has two major 
components, one of the severity of political crises (measured by coups, attempted coups, assassinations, 
and domestic political violence) and one based on the regularity of a nation’s democracy. We decompose 
the index (in Appendix Table 2d) but find no persistent privileging of crises over democracy or vice 
versa. Both seem important. The regularity of elections is important, but alone does not dominate the 
results. Possibly a stable democratic polity with a broad middle class insists on property protection 
(including outside investor protection), with stability giving the government the means to provide it. 
This last result is relevant to seeing how nations that are stable in an intuitive sense fit here — 
Pinochet’s Chile or the pre-1989 Soviet Union, for example. Although governments in each persisted in 
power, neither would have been stable as measured, as both relied on violence to maintain their continuity 
and neither were democratic. Although stable in an intuitive sense, neither would be high on the political 
instability measure (or, perhaps, as we might label the characteristic were we writing on a clean slate here, 
a measure of democratic political regularity) here.
10 
We explored whether institutions whose importance has been brought forward before could be the 
primary ones inducing political instability, perhaps indicating an underlying common cause or 
simultaneous determination. Judicial branch characteristics, such as judicial independence, judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 The IMD measure of recent managerial perceptions predicts differences in debt outcomes, perhaps because a perceptions 
survey picks up finely-grained differences when the aggregate level of violence and instability declined in many nations in the 1990s. 
Equity markets may require stronger institutional support than debt markets.  18                                  
review, and the importance of case law, have been advanced as important to financial development. 
Judicial characteristics could play one of two roles. They are seen as key channels to property rights, of 
which investor protection is a subset, and financial development. Hence, property-degrading political 
instability could be an aggregation of weak institutional channels of property rights protection. Second, at 
least in theory, judicial review could confine the destabilizing tendencies of a grasping legislature or 
executive. 
Prior political science analysis would make one skeptical that either judicial channel would 
strongly affect political stability, as that analysis had judicial review and judicial independence as more 
likely to reflect underlying political consensus (and stability) than to cause it. Whittington (2005: 583, 
594), a political scientist, states: “For … frequent [judicial] constitutional invalidation of legislation and 
executive action to be sustained over time, the courts must operate in a favorable political environment.” 
And, “[p]olitical scientists have been skeptical of the significance of truly counter-majoritarian judicial 
review, which would seem unlikely to find political support in a democratic political system.” 
As for judicial independence, legal scholars view the judicial branch as less powerful than the 
legislative and executive branches. Bickel (1962: 1) begins his legal classic by stating that, despite being 
“the most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known,” the American Supreme Court 
is the “least dangerous branch of the American government” (emphasis added). Its apparent independence 
derives from the polity’s strong consensus on norms and institutions such that first-order political 
institutions accept review from a second-order one. Judicial independence reflects, but does not cause, the 
stability of the other branches. Despite this cause for skepticism, we ran the tests. As reported in the 
unpublished Appendix, instability is robust to judicial variables. The latter are generally not robust to 
instability.    
Many in the political science literature, notably Linz and Valenzuela (1994), argue that 
presidentialist systems, lacking strong constraints on the executive, can destabilize their polities. As we 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 The logic here is that instability undermines a nation’s capacity to protect investors and develop finance, but this is not the 
only channel to financial atrophy. A stable polity may be capable of protecting investors but decide not to, due to its internal political                          19 
report in the unpublished Appendix, there is no significant relationship between presidentialist systems 
and financial development. The SPI index retains its significance in face of the presidentialist system 
variable.  
The judicial and presidential results point to a channel running from instability and its causes to 
financial backwardness, a channel that does not simply reflect the institutions typically seen to help 
stabilize a polity. There seems to be a factor — political instability, presumably due to severe economic 
inequality — that degrades financial systems (or prevents them from developing) and that is independent 
of the standard measures of the quality of political institutions. 
Finally, secondary results are consistent with the importance of political stability. In Table 5, we 
examine corporate law indices relationship with political instability and stock market development, by 
estimating the following OLS regression: 
    (4) Stock Market Development i  =    0 β + 1 β ∗Political Instability i + 2 β ∗Anti-Self-Dealing Index i   
    + 3 β ∗French Civil Law origin i + 4 β ∗Common Law origin i   
    + 5 β ∗Scandinavian Civil Law origin i   
    + 6 β ∗Constructed trade share i + 7 β ∗Log of GDP per capita i  + i ε , 
 
where stock market development for country i is jointly determined by political instability, the anti-self-
dealing index, legal origin, constructed trade share, and the log of GDP per capita. Instability is robust to 
including major formulations of corporate law indices. The anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. 
(2008) is itself significant in most years, although the revised antidirector rights index from Djankov et al. 
(2008) (estimated in an analogous model in panel B) oftentimes is not. Lastly, the revised creditor rights 
index (available for years 1978─2002, see Djankov et al. (2007)), is never statistically significant in 
explaining banking sector development when compared directly with the SPI index, as the Appendix 
reports for an analogous model, but the political instability index typically retains the significance levels 
reported earlier.  
Political stability strongly predicts financial development and is robust to alternative explanations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dynamics with anti-finance parties controlling the polity. Rajan & Zingales (2003) and Roe (2000) examine such possibilities. 20                                  
IV. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESULTS  
A. Sources of Instability:  Does Stability Derive from Legal Origin? 
We now consider the possibility that prominent explanations for financial differences affect 
financial markets by inducing political stability. If political instability is rooted in important part in the 
persistence of a property-owning middle-class as Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) and our results, among 
several, suggest, and if it independently affects financial markets, then (1) current research agendas need 
to broaden and (2) policy advice based on some prominent explanations, such as to primarily emulate 
investor protection institutions of developed countries, is incomplete. For some nations it might even be 
incorrect. Investor protection programs may be insufficient, or might be undone by an unstable polity. 
Even if the currently prominent explanations largely determined political instability, political 
stability would play a key role in law and finance. First, we would thus have identified an important 
channel to financial development. Second, adjacent literatures have focused on conduits to instability due 
to income and wealth inequality, and ethnic fractionalization. Thus, even if prominent explanations for 
financial backwardness flowed through instability, other conflicts and institutions might further 
destabilize (or stabilize) nations that would otherwise be stable (or unstable). 
A first hurdle here is to see whether instability just proxies for legal origin. In assessing whether it 
does, one can consider several national pairings that illustrate the results in the more rigorous examination 
below. Nigeria — a common law country — experienced instability exceeding that of nearby Ivory Coast 
— a civil law country — suggesting that local conditions and not origins have much to do with instability. 
(Nigeria had five years of political instability during 1960─2003, according to Banks’ (2005) widely-used 
measure of instability, the Ivory Coast two.) As measured by the number of military coups since 
independence, common law Nigeria is the most unstable African nation, Amadife (1999: 620) narrates. 
For many of our regressions, legal origin either fails to predict financial development or is not 
consistently robust in doing so, but political stability predicts financial development regularly and is more 
often robust to other influences. To exemplify, Liberia’s, Nigeria’s, and the Sudan’s common law origin                          21 
did not give those nations — subject to violent conflict and political instability — significant advantages 
over civil law nations such as the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Togo in achieving stability. During the two 
decades after African independence, legal origin did not predict the sixty post-independence African 
coups that Rake (1984: 25) compiled. Legal origin did not enable Zimbabwe to overcome the racial and 
economic conflict that destabilized the polity, damaged property rights, and led to sharp economic and 
financial decline. Richardson (2005).   
We also looked for prior evidence that legal origin caused or prevented political instability or its 
constituent elements and did not find any. Economic historians focusing on political instability have not 
reported legal origin as a key channel to instability or related outcomes. For examples, see Dye (2006) 
and Sanders (1981), who review the literature on political instability, indicating many inputs to instability, 
including ethno-linguistic fractionalization, a weak middle class, and inequality, but do not mention legal 
origin. Indeed, that literature emphasizes that civil law countries are too statist, with a heavy government 
presence, and fail to allow financial markets to develop well. The instability channel in play here is 
largely the opposite: a lack of state capacity, not an excess. Huntington (1968) has made a similar point. 
Still, political instability moderately correlates with French civil law. Although the annual political 
instability decay index never has a greater than 0.30 correlation with French Civil Law across the years 
(and typically correlates in the 0.08 to 0.20 range), the SPI Index has a 0.45 correlation with French Civil 
Law.  (SPI’s and the annual indices’ correlation with all other variables is noticeably smaller.)  
To test formally for a collinearity problem, we examined the models with and without the legal 
origin variables and with and without the political instability variables. Our doing so revealed no 
significant change in either set of coefficient results. Normally that would end the matter, even with 
higher collinearity. Moreover, the decay and country fixed effect models suggest a persisting effect of 
prior instability in disrupting later finance, a result more consistent with a varying cause than with the 
rigid effect of origin. We also found substantial variation of political instability inside each origin — 
common law nations such as Liberia, Nigeria, and the Sudan have been quite unstable, a variation that 
also suggested no serious collinearity problem. We tested whether the coefficients on the political 22                                  
instability variable were significantly inflated by legal origin. They were not. The variance inflation factor 
for political instability was consistently less than 1.70 throughout and conventionally concerns about 
multicollinearity generally arise only if the factor approaches 10. Similarly, examining the variance 
inflations factors showed that the coefficients on the legal origin and other variables were not 
meaningfully influenced by collinearity. The mean VIFs across varying specifications are consistently 
less than 3.25. 
We also examined whether standard thinking in adjacent disciplines — that instability often results 
from inequality and ethnic fractionalization — was in play in our data. Income inequality, as proxied by 
the size of the middle class, was indeed highly robust in explaining political instability. Moreover, the 
occasional correlation between French legal origin and political instability typically disappears when we 
control for usual explanations for instability such as a nation’s dependence on crops using unskilled labor, 
its land inequality, and its ethnic fractionalization, as Table 9 shows.  
Additonally, the country fixed effects panels in Table 6 estimate the following panel regression 
with country fixed effects and year dummies: 
(5) Stock Market Development it  =    0 β + 1 β ∗Political Instability it + 2 β ∗Log of GDP per capita it   
+ δ i + γt + it ε , 
where stock market development for country i in year t is jointly determined by political instability, the 
log of GDP per capita, country fixed effects δ i , and a set of year dummies γt. Table 6 shows the in-
country variation of instability strongly predicting financial outcomes, with p<.001. Since these fixed 
effects regressions take out unobserved as well as observed country-specific characteristics that are stable 
over time — like legal origin — they point to political instability being strongly associated with financial 
underdevelopment quite apart from both legal origin and unobserved heterogeneity concerns.  
B. And What Causes Political Instability? 
We do not aim to independently contribute to the literature on the causes of political instability, but 
we do want to discuss it. Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) find that severe economic inequality is the primary                          23 
determinant of political instability and we confirm this finding in our data as well. Investor protection 
institutions may not work well in highly unequal, unstable political environments. 
Other factors contribute to instability, such as ethnic and religious strife, see Alesina and Spolaore 
(1997), Angeles (2006), Collier (2000: 9, 11-13), and Easterly and Levine (1997: 1223); cf. Ayyagari, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2006). Unequal societies also tend to be ethnically heterogeneous, 
Glaeser (2006) reports, and resulting distributional fights impede economic growth, Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) indicate.  
C. The Direction of Causation 
Another causation issue is in theory relevant: could financial development primarily determine 
basic political stability? We suspect that there is here, as is often the case, simultaneity and 
bidirectionality and we are also confident that once a nation is generally politically stable, further 
financial development can further increase economic opportunity, raise the standard of living of the least 
well-off, and thereby induce a virtuous cycle (consider Beck, Demirgüç, and Levine (2007)). But we want 
to check whether the principal route to basic political stability lies through financial development. Did 
weak financial development in, say, the 19
th century primarily determine 20
th century instability (as 
opposed to just being a supporting factor)? And then did that financially-induced instability in turn 
become the primary channel weakening 20
th century financial development? 
Neither a two-stage regression nor modern law and finance theory favor the primary channel as 
being one that runs from weak finance to high instability, particularly the severe instability that is the 
basis for our primary investigation. First, the two-stage regression: The fundamental geography of 
settlement led some nations to turn to crops that were best developed with landholdings worked by large 
pools of unskilled labor. That setting produced deep inequality, both initially and over time, from which 
institutions that perpetuated inequality emerged, a process prominent in Engerman and Sokoloff’s (2002) 
work, which we follow in this dimension. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (2001) work on how 
relative settler mortality in the colonies induced institutional choices that persisted to this day and the 24                                  
related modeling in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) are also suggestive. It is not easy to see how financial 
backwardness would induce underlying instability-generating geographic conditions here. Moreover, the 
economic and political science literature, to the extent it does not attribute instability primarily to 
inequality, attributes it to ethnic fractionalization, as seen in Alesina and Spolaore (1997). Financial 
backwardness is unlikely to induce ethnic fractionalization, although it is plausible that fractionalization 
induced weak financial development both directly and by increasing instability. Because unequal societies 
tend to be ethnically heterogeneous, as Glaeser (2006) reports, and distributional fights in unequal 
societies impede economic growth, as Alesina and Rodrik (1994) indicate, well-established channels run 
to instability that do not run from financial development. Overall it seems unlikely that early financial 
backwardness primarily caused 20
th century political instability, but, again, our data does not fully rule 
out that possibility.
11 These causality channels are illustrated in Figure 6. 
The best way to think of the likely bidirectionality here is as follows: Political stability, based on 
enough inequality-reducing (or the absence of strong inequality-maintaining) institutions, is foundational 
for sparking financial development. This channel is represented by arrows E and A in Figure 6 and 
illustrates the core concepts of the Engerman and Sokoloff (2002, 2005) literature. Once the threshold of 
basic stability is achieved and development starts, further financial development could strengthen the 
economy and sometimes even reduce inequality, as illustrated by arrows D2 and B in Figure 6. 
We first instrument the SPI index with historical and largely exogenous variables used in adjacent 
inquiries, focusing on crops, inequality, and fractionalization. We first set up the instruments with the 
following OLS regression: 
(6) Political Instability i  =    0 β + 1 β ∗Size of the Middle Class i + 2 β ∗Ethnic Fractionalization i   
+ 3 β ∗ Frankema Land Inequality Measure i   
+ 4 β ∗ Rice Export/Total Agricultural Exports in 1975 i   
+ 5 β ∗ Sugar Export/Total Agricultural Exports in 1975 i   
+ 6 β ∗Cocoa Bean Plus Cocoa Powder Export/Total Agricultural Exports in 
1975 i + 7 β ∗Coffee Export/Total Agricultural Exports in 1975 i  
                                                           
11 The earliest years covered by the World Handbook were used, showing statistical support for the fact that political disorder in 
years dating back to 1948 predicted weakness in subsequent debt market development in 1965.                          25 
+ 8 β ∗Tobacco Export/Total Agricultural Exports in 1975 i + 9 β ∗Mean 
Temperature Above 32 degrees Celsius i +  i ε , 
 
where political instability for country i is jointly determined by the size of the middle class, ethnic 
fractionalization, a set of variables measuring the country’s reliance on specific crops (variables that are 
the focus of Engerman and Sokoloff’s (2002) theory about inequality-perpetuating conditions), and 
extreme environmental temperature in that country. 
. The task had multiple data constraints. Many factors behind instability have not been measured 
across many nations and years, reducing the number of observations available. Still, as the estimation in 
model 1 of Table 8 shows, the size of the middle class in 1960 alone explains much variation in the SPI 
index. In full first-stage, we expand upon the simple middle-class model, adding national geographic 
propensity to rely on crops best grown via large pools of unskilled labor — a traditional explanation in 
adjacent academic work for inequality and instability. While there is a risk of some secondary reverse 
causation here reducing the power of crop-propensity instruments — financial weakness may compel 
production of some crops that need no financing — the agricultural evidence strongly points to the 
instruments’ basic validity here. Easterly (2007) shows their validity:    
[C]rop endowments measure … the percent of national arable land area suitable for different 
crops, taking into account such factors as soil, rainfall, temperature, and elevation. [Source 
omitted] discusses the botanical mechanisms by which different ecological zones are compatible 
with some types of crops and not with others. For example, sugarcane does not grow below 15–
16° C, needs an average of about 1200–1500 mm rainfall a year, and favors level rather than 
steeply elevated lands [source omitted]. In contrast, wheat photosynthesizes at low temperatures 
(15 to 20° C) and cannot be grown in the warm tropics (FAO, 2005). These characteristics have 
thus plausibly remained constant over time, thus reflecting historical conditions for inequality. 
 
Rajan and Zingales’ (2003b: 152) anticipate Easterly’s analysis: “Some lands lend themselves to 
intensive farming, while others lend themselves to a mode of agriculture such as plantations that is more 
extensive. This may partly explain why Costa Rica has had a more democratic history than Colombia.” 
Bobonis (2008) confirmed this view when examining contrasting cultivation qualities in Puerto Rico. 
Where land and weather supported labor-intensive cultivation of crops such as coffee, more intensive 26                                  
coercion institutions emerged, such as more rural police and well-funded paramilitary forces. Inequality 
persisted because of institutional structure and the elite’s interest in having a pool of unskilled labor: 
public schooling was less prevalent in such areas and both adult and child literacy was persistently lower 
than in other areas of the island.  
The land inequality variable we use is Frankema’s (2006).
12 Highly unstable countries tend to have 
very high average temperatures, with instability presumably due to the kind of landholdings and resultant 
inequality that the geography induces. In principal, inequality could affect financial development other 
than through political instability and that leakage, if substantial, could defeat its usefulness as an 
instrument here. Two further tests indicate though that this side channel does not dominate. First, we 
reinserted the inequality variable in the second stage; the coefficient was not significant. (The appendix 
displays this model.)  Second, changes in inequality did not directly predict stock market development 
when run without political instability, suggesting it is not primarily a direct determinant of financial 
development but is part of the bundle of determinants of democratic political instability, with that 
instability then having a detrimental effect on financial development. While further work here is 
appropriate and the instrumental variable model is not immune to weakness, including the number of 
surviving observations and the potential for an instrument to itself have some endogenous qualities, these 
two results suggest that a plausible initial interpretation of the instrumental variable model is that the 
channel running from inequality and financial development largely goes through political instability.
13  
In Table 9, we instrument the SPI index from the column 6 results of Table 8 to predict financial 
development. We estimate the following IV model: 
 (7) Financial Market Development (using alternative DVs in succession) i  =    0 β  
                                                           
12 Frankema’s measure is constructed such that higher values signify more land equality. 
13 Some of that future work could account for Beck et al’s (2007) finding that increases in financial development were associated 
with subsequent reductions in inequality. However, they did their work with the old version of the Gini panel, which, although the best 
available to them at the time, was seen as having serious embedded problems. With the recent updates, this association no longer obtains, 
particularly when run in country fixed effect models. (We would expect, though, that redistribution programs that support the poor 
through enhanced credit access for them would show an association between these types of financial changes and inequality reductions; 
our impression is that these programs are not yet widespread enough to have world-wide effects.) 
We reexamined our results, using the recently updated, but not fully vetted GINI data. As with the currently and widely used 
GINI database, changes in inequality did not directly predict stock market development, as can be seen in the appendix 
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+ 1 β ∗Instrumented Political Instability using Equation (6) above i  
+ 2 β ∗French Civil Law origin i + 3 β ∗Common Law origin i   
+ 4 β ∗Scandinavian Civil Law origin i + 5 β ∗Constructed trade share i   
+ 6 β ∗Log of GDP per capita i + i ε , 
 
where financial market development for country i is jointly determined by the instrumented political 
instability using Equation (6) above, by legal origin, by constructed trade share, and by the log of GDP 
per capita. 
The instrumented instability index, using the instruments from model (6) in Table 8, significantly 
explains averaged bank loans to GDP for the years 1965-1975. It also significantly predicts bank loans to 
GDP for the years for which the SPI index overlaps with available financial development data. (It is 
robust in a non-OECD subsample.) It significantly explains the earliest available year of stock market 
development data from the World Bank (for 1988, which is six years after the end of the 1960─1982 
period the SPI index covers). As we report in Table 9, Beck Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine’s (2000) 
financial data, which starts several years earlier the World Bank’s, yield similar results for the importance 
of political stability. Although not robust for every year, the evidence using instrumented SPI is 
sufficiently consistent across time periods and development indicators to indicate that one should not 
reject, and indeed that there’s supportive evidence of, causality as running from stability to finance. 
Each model in Table 9 passes the test of overidentifying restrictions. We used the “estat overid” 
command in STATA after running two-stage least squares models through Panels A and B of Table 9. In 
the first model of Panel A, the resulting chi-square is 10.23 (p=0.25). In the second model A, the chi-
square is 5.71 (p=0.68). In the third, the chi-square is 7.35 (p=0.50). In the fourth, the chi-square is 4.02 
(p=0.86). In the fifth, the chi-square is 7.50 (p=0.48). In the sixth, the chi-square is 5.99 (p=0.65). In the 
first model of Panel B, the chi-square is 8.60 (p=0.38). In the second, it is 6.38 (p=0.60). Hence, the null 
assumption of valid instruments cannot be rejected by this test. Using the “estat firststage” command in 
STATA, we find that the instruments are particularly strong for explaining the stock market development 
results in Model 5 of Panel A (F-statistic=17.70; p=0.00); Model 6 of Panel A (F-statistic of 16.67; 28                                  
p=0.00); and Model 1 of Panel B (F-statistic of 105.40; p=0.00); and the debt market development results 
in Model 2 of Panel B (130.86; p=0.00). The first-stage F-statistics for Models 1-4 of Panel A are 
somewhat weaker: the R
2 in the first stage for those models is relatively high (greater than 0.46), but the F 
statistics do not surpass the usual rule of thumb of 10. Finally, the results of the post-estimation “estat 
endogenous” tests in STATA for every model of Table 9 suggest that political instability can be treated as 
largely exogenous under the usual analysis of instrumental variables. Only in Models 5 and 6 of Panel A 
are the p-values for the robust score chi-square below 0.10; in those two models the p-values are above 
0.05. In all other models the p-values are between 0.26 and 0.91.   
Regardless of the strength of instrumental variable analysis, in general or as applied here, an 
important conceptual basis exists for strong reverse causation being unlikely here. A main thrust of the 
last decade’s law and finance inquiries is that government and legal institutions of some sort are central to 
protecting investors from wrongdoers. But a nation with an unstable political environment could not 
easily produce good government and strong investor protection institutions while remaining unstable 
(Svensson (1998: 1318-1319)), with that investor protection then inducing financial development (in the 
midst of pervasive political instability), and with that good financial development then later stabilizing 
that nation’s previously-unstable polity. The government institutions that investors need for protection are 
inconsistent with an unstable, unreliable polity. Hence, a significant direction of causation — to fit with 
main findings of the prior decade’s law and finance inquiry — must run from stability to finance.  
The instrumental variable results do not mean that other channels do not exist, nor are the 
instruments themselves immune to any challenge. Surely there is some leakage from the channel, with 
severe inequality inducing some financial backwardness other than through political instability. But, 
again, the robustness of instability to measures of economic growth (as shown in the appendix), the fact 
that inequality, when inserted in the second stage is not significant and does not significantly correlate 
with financial outcomes when run without political instability, and the weakness of the association 
between changes in inequality and changes in financial development, each indicate that that the leakage 
does not overwhelm the channel we examine here. The instruments derive from and revolve around the                          29 
possibility that historical inequality and inequality-inducing exogenous institutions affect political 
instability, which in turn affects financial development. Although the channel has not been closely 
examined with recent financial data, it is derived from to concepts in play as early as the time of the 
Greek philosophers and, more recently, in work by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Alesina 
and Perotti (1996), Engerman and Sokoloff (2003), and Gradstein (2007).  
Still, we acknowledge the difficulty of finding perfect instruments and ours are surely imperfect, 
because it is exceedingly difficult to rule out any reverse causation and any possibility that the instrument 
affects the outcome other than through the variable of interest. Yet the existence of an important channel 
running from severe economic inequality to political instability to financial backwardness is not just 
consistent with the instrumental analysis, but also with prior theorizing from political science and 
development economics and such a channel is a good fit with the year-by-year cross-sections with 
multiple measures of political instability going back 4 decades that we present. A strong and robust 
association exists between political instability and financial development and the instrumental variable 
analysis, even if it does not resolve the issue, points further toward a plausible causal channel running 
from the former to the latter.   
D. Interactions with Other Existing Theories 
The data suggests political stability propels financial development and instability retards it, 
independently of instability’s effects on the economy overall. We re-ran our main regressions by adding 
the WDI’s annual growth rate for each nation; the political instability measures’ significance persists, 
providing strong evidence that there is a direct channel from political instability to weak financial 
development, one that does not simply go through economic growth. (Results are reported in the 
unpublished Appendix.) This key channel to financial backwardness runs independently of origins-based 
investor protection, trade openness, and related explanations. But this result obviously does not mean that 
the other theories lack relevance. Trade openness is typically significant too. The colonial endowments 
explanation may work its way through political instability to financial markets, because extractive 30                                  
settlement strategies bred colonial inequality and supporting institutions, with that inequality and those 
institutions continuing up through the modern era. But even so, it remains plausible that it is modern 
instability, and not just poor endowments directly, that mainly impedes later financial markets. In any 
case, as the Appendix shows, the political stability results are robust to colonial endowments. The 
investor protection arm of modern law and finance persists, but it may depend as much on relative 
political stability as on previously-advanced considerations. 
How political instability interacts with the strength of stabilizing institutions remains to be sorted 
out and, while important, is secondary to first seeing that relative political instability needs to be put into 
the causal chain. First, a nation’s current instability could result from its current political institutions 
being unable to stabilize the polity, while a nation with stronger institutions could contain that instability. 
Second, weakened stabilizing institutions could interact with strong political instability to undermine 
finance, either directly or by degrading investor protection institutions. Figure 3 illustrates these channels 
to financial backwardness. Moreover, the current weakness of a polity’s stabilizing institutions could be 
due to severe historical inequality having prevented politically stable institutions, in a way similar to how 
Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff (2000) show that poor institutions developed in New World economies 
that were based on exploitive, plantation-style labor. (This could be illustrated by adding an input to the 
left of the (contemporary) Political Instability/Weak Stabilizing Institutions box in Figure 3, one for 
historically destabilizing institutions.) Also, current instability could be so severe that what would 
otherwise be satisfactory stabilizing institutions cannot contain the explosive instability.
14 Glaeser, 
Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003) model how severe inequality can degrade institutions, either because the 
wealthy degrade them for their own benefit to reduce the have-not’s access to better institutions or 
because the have-nots, seeking to redistribute to themselves,  degrade property institutions that protect the 
wealthy.  Claessens and  Perotti (2007) review similar channels.  Rajan and Zingales (2003a) in particular  
                                                           
14 We do not seek here to uncover how institutions and instability interact. Our aim is to show that instability significantly 
affects financial development and does so independently of the channels that run from or through legal, investor protection, and overall 
economic development. Current instability and severe inequality, whatever are their underlying causes, could either stymie stabilizing 
institutions from emerging or stymie otherwise acceptable ones from functioning well.                           31 
 indicate that the strength of property rights is partly a function of how it is distributed: Our results here, 
with inequality-dependent instability damaging financial development, support these analyses. The degree 
to which each of these channels is in play is well worth exploring. The key point though is that the 
evidence here points to relative political stability as a major factor in the causal chain that explains 
financial development and financial backwardness. 
V. FUTURE WORK:  SPECIFYING THE CHANNELS 
We aim to broaden the research agenda for financial development by furthering the existing 
inquiry into its political economy bases. What else needs to be done here? 
A. Specifying the Channels 
We have noted several plausible channels from instability to financial backwardness already. Here 
we discuss them further. Future work would be needed to understand which channels are the most 
important conduits running from political instability to financial backwardness.  
As we noted above, instability and civil wars have been frequent in the developing world during 
the past half-century. Not only have such armed conflicts not been rare (Banks (2005)), they have not 
been short, with many lasting for more than a decade, and they have not been cheap, costing many 
affected nations more than 50% of their pre-conflict GDP, as Fitzgerald (1987), Richardson and 
Samarasinghe (1991), and  Lindgren (2005: 10-12) show. Such conflicts have been numerous in the past 
half-century, but less frequent recently. 
In highly unstable polities, public officials do not develop private financial markets because they 
have more basic tasks to handle. Instability often renders social capital investments, such as 
entrepreneurs’ building reputations for reliability, less valuable (Collier (1999: 169-170)). Entrepreneurs 
see little point in investing in their reputational and social capital if they expect to be unable to draw on it. 
Instability makes formal rules more unstable (Maurer (2002)), legal reform projects fail (Dye (2006: 
190)), weakens the institutions for good macro-economic policy, and enforcement tools for protecting 
property deteriorate (id.: 195). Civil wars undermine the state, as Collier (1999: 168-169) says, as they 32                                  
weaken “both its institutions such as property rights, and its organizations such as the police. …  [T]he 
rule of law diminish[es]. The enforcement costs of contracts consequently rise and the security of 
property rights is reduced.” Governments cannot credibly commit to broad, long-term property rights 
protections in the midst of political instability, as Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003: 19) explain was the 
case for Mexico:  
[G]overnments under siege, or factions aspiring to be governments, cannot afford to tie their 
hands. This produces two problems for asset holders. First, they cannot know with any degree of 
certainty the content of government policies in the future. Second, asset holders know that the 
government has strong predatory incentives concerning property rights — regardless of its stated 
ideology. If the [current] government is not predatory, someone else [may well] be … . 
 
A politically stable nation provides stronger foundations for financial development. Marketplace 
reputations and informal mechanisms are made worth developing. Cf. Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005); 
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2006); Mayer (2008). Governments can turn to building the institutions of 
financial development when basic issues of order have been resolved. Capital flight decreases. 
Entrepreneurs can focus their efforts on developing their businesses instead of mitigating the impact of 
local political instability. As their businesses grow, the entrepreneurs demand for financing increases. 
B. Refining the Understanding of Instability’s Impact 
Future work should refine how we understand instability’s impact: Instability via a sharp 
governmental change that led not to persistent turmoil but to a stable resolution and then stronger, not 
weaker, financial development over the long-run. On the other hand, equality-enhancing movements that 
fail may yield years of instability as citizens fight over resources, income, and property.  
Because the most prominent political instability index primarily measures violence, a strong 
authoritarian regime might have modest financial development — because the players expect an eventual 
end to the regime that will upset prevailing arrangements — yet be coded as stable, if violence is low. 
Refinement is in order if rigidity breeds expectations of future political instability.  
Lastly, equality, perhaps in particular via a broad property-owning middle-class, may keep a polity 
stable once that equality is achieved, but it may not be easy to generate that equality in societies that do 
not already have it. Some reforms have succeeded ─ post-War land reforms in Taiwan and South Korea                          33 
come to mind ─ others failed or began periods of extended political instability. The basic dilemma is not 
new: Aristotle sketched out these considerations several millennia ago in The Politics: although “the 
equalization of property … tend[s] to prevent the citizens from quarreling (Aristotle (1986: 45, Bk II, Sec. 
VII), efforts to create that equality induce the very conflict that the polity needs to avoid (id: 142-144, Bk 
V, ch. 1.). To avoid turmoil, it is better “to live where equality prevails” (id: 158, Bk V, ch. VII), but not 
necessarily better to strive to get that equality to prevail. 
C. Considering the Future 
We want to end our discussion on a hopeful, future-focused note. For reasons not yet fully 
understood, democratic political stability around the world increased noticeably during the past decade or 
two, as Figures 4 and 5 show. Given the strong relationship we have shown here between stability and 
financial development, the secular decline in political instability in the past decade or two gives reason 
beyond optimistic hope to expect that efforts such as those of the World Bank to initiate financial 
development by building the right investor protection institutions will not go to waste. In such politically 
stable settings, their technical finance-enhancing efforts seem, from the data in this paper, most likely to 
succeed. In unstable political environments, the technical institutions of investor protection are unlikely, 
our data suggests, to strongly propel financial development. Investor protection efforts may work better in 
tandem with new World Bank (2007) initiatives that focus on inequality, although those initiatives do not 
yet link to the possibility of enhancing financial development, nor has the Bank yet analyzed the potential 
impact of its inequality-reducing initiatives on financial development. 
CONCLUSION  
Political instability is important to explaining variation in financial development around the world. 
Considerable attention has been given in the past decade to explaining which institutions foster or impede 
financial development, but democratic political stability as a necessary condition, or instability as a 
serious impediment, has not played the prominent role the results in this paper indicate it deserves. We 
contribute here to understanding the variance in financial development around the world by showing that 34                                  
variation in political stability has a significant, consistent, and substantial impact over many decades on 
debt and stock market development. Democratic political instability needs to be added to the small 
number of core factors that determine financial development around the world. 
Political instability’s impact on finance is investigated here not just to confirm the intuitively 
appealing proposition that instability harms financial markets and does so after controlling for the level of 
a nation’s economic development, but to show that it harms finance independently of each prevailing 
explanation for financial backwardness. Well-regarded conventional measures of political instability — 
such as Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) and Banks’ (2005) indices of severe political crises such as military 
coups, political assassinations, and political violence — persistently and significantly predict a wide range 
of conventional national financial outcomes. These results are robust to investor protection, to legal 
origin, to trade openness, to latitude, and to other measures that have obtained prominence in the past 
decade. These factors could well be in play and we believe several are, but political stability is there as 
well and it is there quite significantly and robustly. Financial backwardness is significantly rooted in 
severe political instability. We thus further extend thinking on the political economy finance, such as that 
in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001); Rajan and Zingales (2003, 2003a, 2003b); Perotti and von 
Thadden (2006); and Pagano and Volpin (2005). 
That basic finding, which holds up year-by-year over several decades, holds up over four different 
measures of instability and over multiple measures of financial development. It holds up in country fixed 
effects and is supported in instrumental variable regressions. It is persistently robust to legal origin and 
quite consistent over time, while origins’ effects are not similarly consistent over time. As such, an 
instability inquiry should open up new policy avenues for financial development and weaken old ones.  
In finding a robust channel running from political instability to financial backwardness, we link 
two major literatures: an economics literature that sees political instability as strongly impeding economic 
development and a finance literature that sees financial development as strongly propelling economic 
development. A primary channel from political stability to economic development could well run through 
financial development.                           35 
Such findings could affect development policy. It may be that rough equality, such as that of a 
broad property-owning middle class, in democratic settings more often than not, induces the political 
stability that is foundational for financial development. Such democratic and stable polities may better be 
able to protect property (of which investor protection is a subset) than can less democratic, unstable 
polities. While development agencies may be unable to deeply change nations in this dimension, their 
knowing where part of the foundation is should better enable them to choose how to help and to know 
which nations will most benefit from their help. This property-owning middle-class foundation for 
finance could be as important as the currently prominent characteristics but has not been a major 
component of recent thinking in academic finance. 
Understanding that political stability is foundational for finance — the task we seek to further here 
— is fundamental, going far in helping to explain cross-country differences in financial development. 
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 Political instability measures
SPI Index
The Sociopolitical Instability (SPI) index measures the overall, average political instability by country for the
period 1960-1982. Principal component analysis was used to construct their index, based on a nation's
number of politically-motivated assassinations during that time period, the number of people killed in domestic
mass violence (as a percentage of the nation's total population), the number of successful and attempted
coups, and a categorical variable for whether the nation is a democracy or a dictatorship, set at 1 for
democracies, 0.5 for semi-democracies, and 0 otherwise.  
Political Instability as a Decaying Factor:   30-Year, 
1% Decay Index
Index created by counting any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present
regime. Underlying data is from the New York Times, as assembled by Banks (2005). We used a moving
index with a 1% annual decay rate. The decay index takes the current year’s observation of political instability
from Banks’ data, adds to that .99 of the prior year’s instability observation, then adds .99
2 of the observation
from two year’s prior, then adds .99
3 from three year’s prior, and so for all available annual observations of
instability from Banks, which go back approximately 30 years for the most recent observations. We used
alternative decay rates of 5% and 10%, using analogous constructions.
IMD instability measure
Lausanne-bassed International Institute of Managerial Development's measure of political instability for recent
years, based on executive surveys. We averaged the annual results for the 1999-2003 and 1999-2004
periods that matched the available years for the financial development indicators.
World Economic Forum instability measure
Survey of business executives on their opinion of likely political stability in a nation for the subsequent five
years.
Financial outcomes
Banking and private debt outcomes
Bank Credit/GDP Equals the amount of bank credit to the private sector divided by GDP. Data available for years 1965─2004.
Private Credit/GDP
Equals the total amount of credit received by the private sector divided by GDP. Data available for years
1965─2004.
Equity market development outcomes
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP Equals stock market capitalization divided by GDP. Data available for years 1988─2004.
Beck's Stock Market Capitalization/GDP Equals stock market capitalization divided by GDP.  Data available for years 1976─2003. 
Controls and instruments
Legal Origin
Index created by coding countries by legal origin, into one of five categories - French Civil Law, Common Law,
Scandinavian Law, Socialist Law, and Germany Civil Law. Any data missing from La Porta et al. is coded using
the CIA Factbook.  
Size of the Middle Class
Indexed by the relative proportion of national income going to the middle class (defined as the third and fourth
quintiles) in 1960 or the most proximate annual observation available after 1960.  
Gini coefficient
Index of income inequality measured by the Gini coefficients in the WIDER World Income Inequality Database
for years 1970-2000.  
Ethnic Fractionalization
Index created by finding the probability that two randomly selected members of a population be of the same
ethnic groups. The definition of ethnicity combines racial and linguistic characteristics.
Natural Geographic Openness - constructed trade 
share
Index measures the trade share of a country and takes into account the following variables: real income per
person; international trade (measured as exports plus imports); log population and log area of countries, and;
dummy variables for whether countries are landlocked and whether they have a common border.
Latitude Index of latitude, measured by distance from the equator.
Log of GDP per capita
Data on GDP per capita in constant U.S. dollars for the years 1965─2004 came from the World Bank’s Word
Development Indicators (WDI) database.
Anti-Self Dealing Index
Index computed by weighting: (1) the approval required by disinterested shareholders; (2) disclosures required
by buyers; (3) whether independent financial review is required; (4) the % of shareholders who are required for
standing to sue; (5) the quality of ex-post periodic disclosures; (6) the ease of rescinding a transaction ex-post;
(7) ease of holding the buyer liable; (8) ease of holding the approving body liable; and (9) access to evidence.
Djankov Anti-Director Rights Index
Updating and correction of earlier index computed by aggregating shareholder rights. Covers the following six
areas: (1) vote by mail; (2) obstacles to the actual exercise of the right to vote (i.e., the requirement that shares
be deposited before the shareholders’ meeting); (3) minority representation on the Board of Directors through
cumulative voting or proportional representation; (4) an oppressed minority mechanism to seek redress in
case of expropriation; (5) pre-emptive rights to subscribe to new securities issued by the company; and (6)
right to call a special shareholder meeting.
Creditor Rights Index
Index measures four powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy. First, whether there are restrictions, such as
creditor consent, when a debtor files for reorganization. Second, whether secured creditors are able to seize
their collateral after the petition for reorganization is approved, in other words whether there is no ‘automatic
stay’ or ‘asset freeze’ imposed by the court. Third, whether secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds
of liquidating a bankrupt firm. Finally, whether an administrator, and not management, is responsible for
running the business during the reorganization. A value of one is added to the index when a country’s laws
and regulations provide each of these powers to secured lenders. The creditor rights index aggregates the
scores and varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights).
Land Inequality
Index compiled by calculating the Gini coefficients of inequality of land distribution. Gini analysis is performed
on the decile distributions of the total number of land holdings (farms), and the total amount of agricultural land
(excluding communal pastures and forests).
Rice, sugar, cocoa, coffee, and tobacco export/total 
agricultural exports in 1975 Equals the proportion of total agricultural exports accounted for by each agricultural item in 1975.
Mean temperature above 32 degrees Celsius
Index taking 1 if the mean temperature of the capital city is above 32 degree celsius, 0 otherwise.
Temperatures were taken from the sixth edition of the National Geographic Atlas of the World (Garver, Payne,
& Canby, 1990).
Table 1.  Description of VariablesTable 2. Political Instability and Credit Market Size (1965-1990)
Year of Data SPI Index French Civil Law Common Law Scandinavian Civil Law Constructed Trade Share Log of GDP per capita
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Obs p value R-squared
1965 -0.426*** -2.93 -34.473** -2.22 -36.762** -2.32 -27.287* -1.71 -0.356** -2.43 7.471*** 4.04 57 0.000 0.618
1966 -0.419*** -2.85 -35.590** -2.36 -37.620** -2.50 -25.970* -1.70 -0.344** -2.48 7.169*** 4.06 59 0.000 0.614
1967 -0.446*** -3.02 -33.924** -2.25 -35.921** -2.38 -25.036 -1.63 -0.369*** -2.66 7.374*** 4.19 59 0.000 0.625
1968 -0.386** -2.60 -32.734** -2.10 -33.840** -2.18 -23.427 -1.44 -0.321** -2.34 7.585*** 4.23 60 0.000 0.595
1969 -0.395*** -2.68 -32.145** -2.08 -34.564** -2.24 -23.978 -1.43 -0.294** -2.03 7.649*** 4.35 60 0.000 0.595
1970 -0.356** -2.34 -45.695** -2.63 -47.148*** -2.68 -38.647** -2.16 -0.368** -2.04 8.067*** 4.44 60 0.000 0.624
1971 -0.347** -2.16 -38.263** -2.23 -39.935** -2.27 -31.592* -1.79 -0.411** -2.02 8.023*** 4.15 61 0.000 0.593
1972 -0.376* -2.00 -38.670** -2.13 -41.095** -2.23 -34.512* -1.84 -0.502** -2.41 8.435*** 4.16 61 0.000 0.587
1973 -0.401** -2.47 -35.316** -2.01 -37.768** -2.12 -33.950* -1.84 -0.482** -2.24 8.794*** 4.68 61 0.000 0.585
1974 -0.523*** -3.70 -27.381 -1.60 -30.231* -1.71 -29.144 -1.62 -0.333 -1.36 8.691*** 4.74 63 0.000 0.564
1975 -0.580*** -3.66 -28.636 -1.47 -30.744 -1.55 -34.028* -1.74 -0.075 -0.26 8.157*** 4.20 65 0.000 0.505
1976 -0.551*** -3.03 -33.921* -1.73 -36.099* -1.81 -39.760** -2.03 -0.084 -0.31 8.232*** 4.07 66 0.000 0.529
1977 -0.495*** -3.01 -35.679* -1.82 -35.987* -1.76 -41.779** -2.08 -0.028 -0.09 8.537*** 4.12 66 0.000 0.529
1978 -0.553*** -3.06 -35.193* -1.74 -37.807* -1.79 -46.302** -2.16 0.052 0.17 8.731*** 3.99 65 0.000 0.520
1979 -0.602*** -3.28 -38.091* -1.84 -39.028* -1.78 -48.623** -2.20 0.133 0.38 8.162*** 3.67 66 0.000 0.509
1980 -0.645*** -3.48 -42.266** -2.02 -44.521** -2.01 -52.689** -2.41 0.101 0.29 7.037*** 3.25 66 0.000 0.501
1981 -0.626*** -3.50 -42.776** -2.03 -45.446** -2.04 -53.376** -2.35 0.058 0.16 7.067*** 3.17 66 0.000 0.467
1982 -0.387 -1.62 -45.440** -2.00 -47.332* -1.95 -59.860** -2.50 0.054 0.13 8.792*** 3.51 66 0.000 0.439
1983 -0.477** -2.34 -45.429* -1.82 -46.294* -1.71 -61.213** -2.41 0.164 0.33 8.702*** 3.28 66 0.000 0.427
1984 -0.464** -2.11 -47.850* -1.77 -45.301 -1.50 -62.917** -2.38 0.383 0.58 9.947*** 3.35 66 0.000 0.409
1985 -0.680** -2.02 -55.798** -2.19 -52.708* -1.93 -63.724** -2.50 0.245 0.52 7.992*** 2.91 66 0.000 0.445
1986 -0.875** -2.38 -57.210** -2.25 -59.676** -2.21 -59.983** -2.28 -0.085 -0.23 7.191*** 2.83 65 0.000 0.463
1987 -0.677* -1.73 -62.937** -2.34 -63.843** -2.26 -67.467** -2.51 -0.124 -0.36 9.483*** 3.65 66 0.000 0.506
1988 -0.702* -1.70 -58.444** -2.11 -58.095** -2.03 -65.953** -2.37 -0.147 -0.37 11.838*** 4.72 67 0.000 0.516
1989 -0.689 -1.63 -60.794** -2.16 -62.654** -2.18 -66.418** -2.36 -0.298 -0.73 12.772*** 5.00 66 0.000 0.547
1990 -0.335 -1.17 -69.062** -2.57 -63.227** -2.28 -62.886** -2.14 -0.241 -0.68 13.747*** 6.88 67 0.000 0.599
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions in which bank credit is the dependent variable and the instability measures, legal origin dummies, constructed trade share, and log GDP 
per capita are independent variables.  The German Civil Law dummy is the omitted dummy variable.  The instability measure is Alesina-Perotti's sociopolitical instability (SPI) index, which runs through 
1982,  Although the SPI index and its underlying source data end in 1982, we regress debt outcomes on the measure for the rest of that decade to ascertain whether it has 
 Bank Credit/GDP as predicted by political instability, legal origin, trade, and log GDP per capita
continuing predictive value.    We run similar OLS regressions with other credit measures, such a total private credit and bond debt, in the Appendix.  Results are similar. There were no Socialist Law 
countries with available SPI data.  T-statistics appear to the right of each coefficient, with statistical significance is assessed based on robust standard errors.   *** indicates significance at the .01 level, ** 
indicates significance at the .05 level, and * indicates significance at the .10 level.Table 3.  Political Instability and Equity Market Development, 1976-2003
Year of Data SPI Index French Civil Law Common Law Scandinavian Civil Law Constructed Trade ShareLog of GDP per capita
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Obs p value R-squared
1976 -0.007 -0.58 0.020 0.23 0.206 1.61 -0.115 -1.47 0.000 -0.14 0.029 0.51 17 0.056 0.431
1980 -0.005* -1.77 0.003 0.04 0.239* 1.95 -0.111 -1.50 -0.002 -0.94 0.061*** 2.88 29 0.008 0.418
1981 -0.005* -1.95 -0.013 -0.17 0.205* 1.91 -0.112 -1.54 -0.004* -1.97 0.064*** 3.78 36 0.001 0.423
1982 -0.005* -1.90 -0.010 -0.11 0.221* 1.98 -0.108 -1.31 -0.001 -0.61 0.063*** 3.71 37 0.000 0.451
1983 -0.005** -2.07 -0.018 -0.21 0.204* 1.90 -0.099 -1.12 -0.002 -1.12 0.067*** 4.16 40 0.000 0.481
1984 -0.005** -2.23 -0.055 -0.59 0.165 1.47 -0.105 -1.12 -0.004** -2.11 0.072*** 4.30 40 0.000 0.501
1985 -0.005** -2.45 -0.127 -1.00 0.090 0.65 -0.190 -1.45 -0.003 -1.39 0.078*** 4.93 40 0.000 0.520
1986 -0.006*** -2.98 -0.155 -1.05 0.094 0.59 -0.240 -1.54 -0.005* -1.80 0.099*** 5.96 42 0.000 0.530
1987 -0.007*** -3.17 -0.177 -1.00 0.074 0.39 -0.273 -1.54 -0.006* -1.97 0.106*** 5.42 44 0.000 0.519
1988 -0.007*** -2.94 -0.219 -1.07 0.012 0.05 -0.260 -1.30 -0.007* -1.98 0.101*** 4.48 43 0.000 0.465
1989 -0.007** -2.63 -0.307 -1.21 -0.081 -0.30 -0.319 -1.31 -0.008* -1.79 0.110*** 4.23 43 0.000 0.474
1990 -0.007** -2.27 -0.244 -1.14 -0.026 -0.11 -0.269 -1.34 -0.008* -1.88 0.094*** 3.93 44 0.000 0.447
1991 -0.007** -2.42 -0.129 -0.79 0.088 0.47 -0.194 -1.22 -0.007* -1.98 0.086*** 3.68 44 0.000 0.394
1992 -0.008** -2.23 -0.078 -0.50 0.170 0.98 -0.206 -1.35 -0.007*** -3.04 0.091*** 4.07 47 0.000 0.408
1993 -0.009 -1.56 -0.045 -0.23 0.298 1.28 -0.191 -1.03 -0.007* -1.97 0.101*** 3.11 49 0.003 0.297
1994 -0.012 -1.58 -0.026 -0.12 0.297 1.12 -0.164 -0.81 -0.008** -2.13 0.091** 2.38 48 0.010 0.237
1995 -0.009* -1.92 -0.073 -0.30 0.195 0.74 -0.165 -0.71 -0.009*** -2.68 0.088** 2.66 51 0.001 0.251
1996 -0.009* -1.84 -0.072 -0.25 0.206 0.66 -0.158 -0.55 -0.009** -2.46 0.123** 3.46 51 0.000 0.264
1997 -0.008** -2.04 -0.129 -0.34 0.135 0.35 -0.131 -0.33 -0.009** -2.16 0.150*** 4.83 53 0.000 0.356
1998 -0.007* -1.96 -0.180 -0.37 0.053 0.11 -0.167 -0.33 -0.007 -1.50 0.181*** 6.10 54 0.000 0.427
2000 -0.004 -0.89 -0.148 -0.25 0.125 0.21 0.106 0.14 0.002 0.23 0.254*** 6.26 54 0.000 0.414
2003 -0.002 -0.58 -0.177 -0.43 0.077 0.18 -0.158 -0.37 -0.007* -1.69 0.166*** 6.16 51 0.000 0.379
Year of Data French Civil Law Common Law Scandinavian Civil Law Socialist Law Constructed Trade Share
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Obs p value R-squared
1983 -0.007*** -2.73 -0.078 -0.96 0.168 1.52 -0.177** -2.18 0.004*** 14.12 0.052*** 2.89 37 0.000 0.743
1984 -0.007** -2.35 -0.099 -1.05 0.139 1.12 -0.197** -2.10 0.005*** 10.41 0.058*** 3.42 37 0.000 0.773
1985 -0.008* -2.02 -0.183 -1.46 0.073 0.51 -0.306** -2.60 0.008*** 11.40 0.066*** 3.73 37 0.000 0.847
1986 -0.011* -1.89 -0.213 -1.54 0.086 0.52 -0.390*** -2.78 0.010*** 9.72 0.088*** 4.38 39 0.000 0.849
1987 -0.013* -1.81 -0.259 -1.31 0.049 0.22 -0.494** -2.33 0.014*** 9.04 0.088*** 3.38 39 0.000 0.861
1988 -0.013 -1.62 -0.362 -1.53 -0.074 -0.27 -0.569** -2.19 0.016*** 8.60 0.081** 2.70 38 0.000 0.858
1989 -0.013* -1.97 -0.508** -2.27 -0.269 -1.05 -0.672*** -2.77 0.009*** 8.65 0.101*** 4.27 38 0.000 0.803
1990 -0.011** -2.48 -0.239 -1.16 -0.003 -0.01 -0.358 -1.68 0.002*** 2.83 0.100*** 4.37 44 0.000 0.476
1991 -0.013*** -2.73 -0.081 -0.48 0.162 0.82 -0.235 -1.45 0.001** 2.67 0.092*** 4.02 44 0.000 0.432
1992 -0.009*** -3.01 -0.088 -0.59 0.149 0.86 -0.258* -1.75 -0.226 -1.39 0.001* 1.97 0.085*** 4.08 51 0.000 0.412
1993 -0.011** -2.24 -0.085 -0.50 0.292 1.29 -0.245 -1.49 -0.244 -1.30 0.002*** 2.91 0.091*** 2.83 53 0.000 0.332
1994 -0.012** -2.03 -0.086 -0.44 0.309 1.17 -0.230 -1.23 -0.321 -1.57 0.003*** 3.52 0.082** 2.32 54 0.000 0.314
1995 -0.012** -2.26 -0.067 -0.32 0.233 0.89 -0.295 -1.35 -0.321 -1.51 0.003*** 2.79 0.092*** 3.08 59 0.000 0.325
1996 -0.016** -2.40 -0.029 -0.11 0.277 0.90 -0.267 -0.99 -0.263 -1.01 0.003*** 2.77 0.119*** 3.76 60 0.000 0.353
1997 -0.012** -2.35 -0.061 -0.18 0.218 0.60 -0.216 -0.58 -0.177 -0.51 0.003* 1.78 0.162*** 6.21 71 0.000 0.413
1998 -0.009** -2.03 -0.117 -0.26 0.108 0.24 -0.252 -0.53 -0.192 -0.43 0.002 1.43 0.195*** 7.02 74 0.000 0.461
1999 -0.008 -1.33 -0.176 -0.37 0.105 0.21 -0.165 -0.29 -0.253 -0.52 0.002* 1.68 0.236*** 6.89 74 0.000 0.469
2000 -0.007 -1.02 -0.200 -0.35 0.081 0.14 -0.059 -0.08 -0.286 -0.49 0.002 1.61 0.260*** 7.07 74 0.000 0.440
2001 -0.007 -1.22 -0.128 -0.25 0.110 0.21 -0.045 -0.08 -0.210 -0.41 0.001 0.86 0.226*** 7.26 72 0.000 0.443
2002 -0.008 -1.47 -0.093 -0.25 0.106 0.28 -0.114 -0.28 -0.224 -0.60 0.000 0.35 0.163*** 5.56 73 0.000 0.377
2003 -0.011** -2.02 -0.150 -0.41 0.043 0.12 -0.217 -0.56 -0.277 -0.74 0.001 0.86 0.159*** 6.31 68 0.000 0.417
One-Percent Thirty-
Year Political Instability 
Decay Index
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions in which stock market capitalization/GDP measures are the dependent variables and instability measures, legal origin dummies, constructed trade 
share, and log GDP per capita are independent variables.  The German Civil Law dummy is the omitted dummy variable.  Panel A uses the Alesina-Perotti instability index, which runs through 1982, as the independent 
measure of instability.  Although their SPI index and its underlying source data end in 1982, we regress outcomes for subsequent years to see if it has continuing predictive value.  There were no Socialist Law countries 
with available SPI data.  Panel B uses the same measure of stock market capitalization/GDP and uses Banks' measure of political instability, which has observations running through 2003.  Banks' data has 
observations for socialist law countries in most years; for 1983-1991, there were no Socialist Law countries with data on all variables.  We construct a index of decaying influence of prior years' instability (as described 
in Table 1 and in the text.)  Table B uses a 1% decay rate on Banks' instability.  In the Appendix we construct similar indices of decaying influence, one with a 5% rate and another with a 10% rate. Results are similar. T-s
Panel A:  Stock market capitalization/GDP (via  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine's measure) as predicted by political instability (via SPI), legal origin, trade and log GDP per capita
Panel B:  Stock market capitalization/GDP (via  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine's measure) as predicted by political instability (via Banks-based 1% decay index), legal origin, trade and log GDP per capita
Log of GDP per capita
*** indicates significantce at the .01 level, ** indicates significance at the the .05 level, and * indicates signifcance at the .10 level.Table 4.  Changes in Political Instability as Predicting Recent Financial Development
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Increase in political instability (as measured by: 
((Political instability decay index 2000/ Political 
instability decay index 1990) - 1) -1.146 ** -1.117 ** -1.166 ** -1.049 **
[0.554] [0.501] [0.542] [0.472]
Log of GDP per capita 1990 -0.247 -0.347
[0.341] [0.366]
Constructed trade share -0.009 * -0.009 * -0.003
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Latitude 2.320 0.846 1.823
[3.862] [2.660] [3.759]
Increase in economic development (as 
measured by Log of GDP per capita 2000/         
Log of GDP per capita 1990) -7.265 -17.571
[21.372] [21.252]
Political Instability 1990 base effect (note that 
this is negative because of collinearity with the 
main variable of interest) 0.147 **
[0.060]
Obs 44 44 44 44
p value 0.045 0.121 0.127 0.037
R-squared 0.052 0.078 0.073 0.213
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions in which Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine's 2000 measure of Stock Market 
Capitalization/GDP divided by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine's 1990 measure of Stock Market Capitalization/GDP is the dependent variable.  The 
ratio of the (political instability decay index in the year 2000 to its value in the year 1990) minus 1, is the principal variable of interest.  We control for 
log GDP per capita, trade, and latitude.   In a robustness check, we also control for the ratio of log GDP per capita in 2000 to log GDP per capita in 
1990.  Robust standard errors appear below each coefficient in brackets.  *** means significance at the .01 level, ** means significance at the .05 
level, and * means significance at the .10 level.
DV: (Levine Stock Market Capitalization/GDP 2000)/(Levine Stock Market Capitalization/GDP 1990)Table 5.  Political Instability, Equity Market Development, and Corporate Law Indices
Year of Data French Civil Law Common Law Scandinavian Civil Law Socialist Law Constructed Trade Share Log of GDP per capita
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Obs p value R-squared
1983 -0.008*** -2.76 0.197 1.19 -0.065 -0.80 0.112 1.15 -0.180** -2.14 0.004*** 15.57 0.052*** 3.10 37 0.000 0.753
1984 -0.009** -2.54 0.206 1.25 -0.074 -0.79 0.083 0.73 -0.198** -2.06 0.005*** 11.12 0.057*** 3.60 36 0.000 0.786
1985 -0.010** -2.15 0.191 1.21 -0.159 -1.24 0.015 0.10 -0.306** -2.48 0.008*** 11.93 0.064*** 3.70 36 0.000 0.855
1986 -0.013* -2.03 0.376** 2.12 -0.180 -1.24 -0.027 -0.16 -0.391** -2.59 0.010*** 10.57 0.080*** 4.29 38 0.000 0.863
1987 -0.014* -1.86 0.520** 2.32 -0.248 -1.27 -0.115 -0.52 -0.503** -2.35 0.014*** 9.66 0.078*** 3.21 39 0.000 0.873
1988 -0.015 -1.68 0.558** 2.14 -0.349 -1.54 -0.251 -0.97 -0.579** -2.29 0.016*** 9.11 0.069** 2.48 38 0.000 0.868
1989 -0.014* -1.99 0.466* 2.02 -0.499** -2.31 -0.418* -1.75 -0.681*** -2.86 0.010*** 9.57 0.090*** 3.96 38 0.000 0.818
1990 -0.012** -2.36 0.582** 2.34 -0.258 -1.40 -0.230 -1.17 -0.396** -2.04 0.002*** 4.51 0.082*** 3.49 43 0.000 0.547
1991 -0.015** -2.54 0.569** 2.14 -0.098 -0.67 -0.062 -0.38 -0.271* -1.84 0.002*** 4.27 0.072*** 2.94 43 0.000 0.505
1992 -0.013*** -2.76 0.539** 2.23 -0.051 -0.37 0.017 0.13 -0.294** -2.16 -0.253* -1.85 0.002*** 3.73 0.086*** 3.46 47 0.000 0.544
1993 -0.016** -2.27 0.788** 2.09 -0.033 -0.20 0.098 0.57 -0.298* -1.80 -0.298* -1.73 0.003*** 4.11 0.087** 2.25 49 0.000 0.476
1994 -0.018** -2.21 0.889** 2.08 -0.037 -0.20 0.090 0.44 -0.293 -1.54 -0.449** -2.06 0.004*** 5.91 0.074* 1.74 50 0.000 0.459
1995 -0.017** -2.49 0.820** 2.30 -0.043 -0.20 -0.006 -0.03 -0.322 -1.47 -0.493** -2.15 0.004*** 5.62 0.058 1.56 53 0.000 0.461
1996 -0.020** -2.48 0.829** 2.23 -0.004 -0.01 0.046 0.17 -0.295 -1.06 -0.445 -1.61 0.004*** 5.34 0.090** 2.27 53 0.000 0.465
1997 -0.017*** -2.74 0.561** 2.11 -0.019 -0.05 0.115 0.33 -0.234 -0.61 -0.326 -0.92 0.004*** 4.97 0.136*** 4.02 59 0.000 0.521
1998 -0.015** -2.50 0.373* 1.68 -0.059 -0.13 0.094 0.21 -0.269 -0.55 -0.285 -0.64 0.003*** 4.79 0.185*** 5.32 59 0.000 0.541
1999 -0.015** -2.02 0.491* 1.79 -0.111 -0.23 0.009 0.02 -0.183 -0.31 -0.382 -0.81 0.003*** 3.57 0.219*** 5.17 59 0.000 0.496
2000 -0.014* -1.71 0.494 1.62 -0.135 -0.23 -0.025 -0.04 -0.076 -0.10 -0.423 -0.75 0.002*** 2.80 0.242*** 5.35 59 0.000 0.456
2001 -0.013* -1.87 0.436 1.66 -0.095 -0.19 0.047 0.10 -0.063 -0.10 -0.338 -0.67 0.002** 2.61 0.207*** 5.48 59 0.000 0.470
2002 -0.013* -2.00 0.266 1.16 -0.080 -0.22 0.110 0.31 -0.130 -0.32 -0.321 -0.89 0.001** 2.25 0.144*** 3.95 59 0.000 0.417
2003 -0.015** -2.49 0.332 1.58 -0.150 -0.41 0.018 0.05 -0.236 -0.60 -0.379 -1.04 0.002*** 2.88 0.138*** 4.68 58 0.000 0.498
Year of Data French Civil Law Common Law Scandinavian Civil Law Socialist Law Constructed Trade Share
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Obs p value R-squared
1983 -0.007** -2.59 0.031 1.19 -0.051 -0.60 0.148 1.44 -0.187** -2.26 0.004*** 17.88 0.055*** 2.90 37 0.000 0.753
1984 -0.009** -2.35 0.042 1.36 -0.058 -0.60 0.112 0.97 -0.209** -2.17 0.005*** 11.37 0.061*** 3.43 36 0.000 0.790
1985 -0.010* -2.02 0.076** 2.31 -0.121 -0.95 0.025 0.18 -0.329** -2.73 0.008*** 13.16 0.073*** 4.24 36 0.000 0.871
1986 -0.014* -1.97 0.088** 2.55 -0.120 -0.86 0.036 0.24 -0.414*** -2.89 0.011*** 11.42 0.097*** 5.27 38 0.000 0.873
1987 -0.014* -1.78 0.101 2.38 -0.182 -0.92 -0.019 -0.09 -0.529** -2.45 0.015*** 10.07 0.096*** 3.86 39 0.000 0.877
1988 -0.014 -1.64 0.114** 2.33 -0.272 -1.16 -0.152 -0.58 -0.608** -2.32 0.017*** 9.47 0.089*** 3.10 38 0.000 0.873
1989 -0.014* -1.99 0.100*** 2.82 -0.428* -1.92 -0.338 -1.39 -0.705*** -2.90 0.010*** 10.14 0.107*** 4.93 38 0.000 0.828
1990 -0.012** -2.36 0.080** 2.03 -0.193 -0.96 -0.075 -0.36 -0.399* -1.95 0.002*** 4.39 0.104*** 4.45 43 0.000 0.516
1991 -0.014** -2.59 0.078* 1.85 -0.033 -0.20 0.091 0.52 -0.274* -1.80 0.002*** 4.08 0.094*** 3.96 43 0.000 0.474
1992 -0.012*** -2.92 0.064 1.57 -0.013 -0.09 0.155 0.99 -0.289** -2.08 -0.092 -0.47 0.002*** 3.88 0.098*** 3.91 47 0.000 0.494
1993 -0.015** -2.34 0.101* 1.70 0.030 0.18 0.301 1.49 -0.295* -1.89 -0.039 -0.17 0.003*** 4.50 0.110*** 2.85 49 0.000 0.427
1994 -0.017** -2.21 0.119* 1.93 0.043 0.22 0.318 1.34 -0.292 -1.62 -0.161 -0.66 0.004*** 5.93 0.102** 2.40 50 0.000 0.419
1995 -0.016** -2.46 0.090* 1.94 0.014 0.06 0.229 0.93 -0.358 -1.60 -0.305 -1.29 0.004*** 5.05 0.084** 2.34 53 0.000 0.414
1996 -0.018** -2.43 0.085* 1.79 0.053 0.20 0.291 0.99 -0.327 -1.18 -0.256 -0.91 0.004*** 4.64 0.117*** 3.03 53 0.000 0.421
1997 -0.017*** -2.78 0.072* 1.73 0.056 0.16 0.260 0.73 -0.268 -0.70 -0.171 -0.47 0.004*** 4.78 0.164*** 5.65 59 0.000 0.499
1998 -0.015** -2.53 0.046 1.20 -0.011 -0.02 0.192 0.43 -0.291 -0.60 -0.184 -0.40 0.003*** 4.47 0.202*** 6.82 59 0.000 0.531
1999 -0.015** -2.01 0.061 1.28 -0.045 -0.09 0.139 0.28 -0.212 -0.36 -0.249 -0.50 0.003*** 3.19 0.242*** 6.42 59 0.000 0.483
2000 -0.013* -1.71 0.069 1.30 -0.065 -0.11 0.098 0.17 -0.110 -0.15 -0.287 -0.48 0.002** 2.52 0.266*** 6.75 59 0.000 0.448
2001 -0.013* -1.84 0.064 1.37 -0.032 -0.06 0.151 0.29 -0.095 -0.16 -0.217 -0.41 0.002** 2.28 0.228*** 6.81 59 0.000 0.462
2002 -0.013* -1.97 0.049 1.30 -0.035 -0.10 0.164 0.44 -0.156 -0.38 -0.245 -0.64 0.001** 2.10 0.157*** 4.21 59 0.000 0.416
2003 -0.015** -2.44 0.055 1.46 -0.098 -0.27 0.092 0.25 -0.264 -0.68 -0.288 -0.75 0.002*** 2.72 0.153*** 5.51 58 0.000 0.494
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions in which Stock Market Capitalization/GDP is the dependent variable and political instability, via a 1% decay index based on Banks' instability measure, two frequently used 
measures of corporate law quality prominent in the finance literature, legal origin dummies, constructed trade share, and log GDP per capita are independent variables.  The German Civil Law dummy is the omitted dummy variable, and t-
statistics appear to the right of each coefficient.  Panel A uses the Anti-Self-Dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008), and Panel B uses the revised anti-director rights index (updated ADRI) (also from Djankov et al. (2008)).  Banks' data has 
observations for socialist law countries in most years; for 1983-1991, there were no Socialist Law countries with data on all variables.  Statistical significance is assessed based on robust standard errors.   *** indicates significance at the .01 
level, ** significance at the .05 level, and * significance at the .10 level.  
Panel A:  Stock market capitalization/GDP (via  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine's measure)  as predicted by political instability (via Banks-based 1% decay index), Anti-Self Dealing Index, legal origin, trade and log GDP per capita
Panel B:  Stock market capitalization/GDP (via  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine's measures)  as predicted by political instability (via Banks-based 1% decay index), the updated antidirector rights index, legal origin, trade and log GDP per 
Revised ADRI (from 
Djankov et al. (2008)) Log of GDP per capita
One-Percent Thirty-
Year Political Instability 
Decay Index
One-Percent Thirty-
Year Political Instability 
Decay Index
Anti-Self-Dealing 
Index from Djankov et 
al. (2008)Table 6.   Country Fixed Effects 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2
One Percent Political Instability Decay Index -2.725 *** -0.007 **
[0.562] [0.003]
Log GDP per capita 11.906 0.124 *
[10.683] [0.068]
Obs 996 1311
Number of countries 85 81
Country fixed effects included Yes Yes
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes
p value 0.000 0.000
R-squared (within) 0.191 0.323
DV: Stock Market 
Capitalization/GDP 
(1988-2003)
DV: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Levine's Stock Market 
Capitalization/ GDP (1976-
2003)
This table presents the results of panel regressions with country-level fixed effects and year dummies.  The 
dependent variable in in the first model is the World Bank's measure of stock market capitalization to GDP.  In the 
second model the dependent variable is Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine's Stock Market Capitalization/ GDP (1976-
2003).  We use the Banks-based index of political instability, with the index decaying, as described in Table 1 and in 
the paper's text.  The instability measure is significant in both country fixed effects models.  
Robust standard errors appear below each coefficient in brackets.  Note: *** means significance at the .01 level, ** 
means significance at the .05 level, and * means significance at the .10 level.  The data from Banks is available until 
2003.  The stock market data is available back to 1988 in model 1 and back to 1976 in Model 2.  Hence, the models 
account for all available data.Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2
SPI Index -0.007 **
[0.003]
One Percent Political Instability Decay Index -0.015 **
[0.006]
French Civil Law -0.084 -0.047
[0.289] [0.256]
German Civil Law 0.127 0.162
[0.296] [0.268]
Scandinavian Civil Law 0.017 -0.019
[0.337] [0.321]
Constructed Trade Share -0.005 -0.001
[0.005] [0.003]
Log GDP per capita 0.143 *** 0.156 ***
[0.035] [0.032]
Number of countries 41 43
p value 0.000 0.001
R-squared (within) 0.442 0.463
DV: (External Market 
Capitalization/GDP) 
average for Years 
1996-2000 from La 
Porta et al. (2006)
DV: (External Market 
Capitalization/GDP) 
average for Years 
1996-2000 from La 
Porta et al. (2006)
Table 7.  Alternative Indicator for External Market Capitalization
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions using La Porta et al.'s (2006) measures of 
external market capitalization.   Model 1 uses the SPI index, which runs until 1982, to measure instability; 
Model 2 uses the Banks data (in a decay index described in Table 1), which run until 2003.   Instability is 
significant in both models.  Robust standard errors appear below each coefficient in brackets.  *** indicates 
significance at the .01 level, ** significance at the .05 level, and * significance at the .10 level. Table 8.  Political Instability, Income Inequality, and Agricultural Conditions
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size of the Middle Class -108.061 *** -80.645 *** -102.295 *** -107.074 *** -90.800 *** -126.322 ***
[24.891] [26.863] [31.007] [34.481] [23.386] [28.466]
Ethnic fractionalization 12.608 ** -0.123 2.238 -2.873 -3.878
[5.900] [4.110] [5.305] [4.273] [4.007]
Frankema land inequality (theil) 13.831 * 11.452 10.174 14.751 **
[8.019] [7.198] [6.234] [6.996]
Rice export/total agricultural exports in 1975 26.667 ** 22.011 ** 25.108 ** 25.316 **
[12.541] [8.802] [11.411] [11.617]
Sugar export/total agricultural exports in 1975 -9.945 -11.607 -8.826 -12.105
[7.164] [8.328] [7.661] [8.218]
Cocoa bean plus cocoa powder export/total agriculural exports in 1975 31.541 *** 24.859 *** 36.494 ***
[9.157] [6.594] [7.548]
Coffee export/total agricultural exports in 1975 -30.397 ** -18.093 -30.762 **
[13.242] [13.176] [13.334]
Tobacco export/total agricultural exports in 1975 -4.290 -10.773 0.223 -6.913
[11.215] [14.051] [12.278] [13.601]
Mean temperature above 32 degrees Celsius 12.911 *** 10.322 *** 10.360 *** 12.561 ***
[3.137] [2.929] [3.281] [2.818]
French Civil Law 3.923
[2.584]
Common Law -1.490
[2.263]
Scandinavian Civil Law 1.702
[1.308]
Obs 64 64 53 53 53 53
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.221 0.276 0.618 0.465 0.490 0.575
Note: land inequality comes from Frankema (2006); mean temperature above 32 degrees Celsius comes from Van de Viliert (1999), and crop data comes from FAO Trade Yearbook (1977).
DV: Political Instability
This table presents the results of an OLS regressions in which the SPI Index is the dependent variable and the size of the middle class, ethnic fractionalization, Frankema's measure of land inequality, geographic attractiveness for 
different cash crops, extreme mean temperature, and legal origin serve as independent variables.  For the size of the middle class, we use Perotti's (1996) measure of the size of the middle class (third and fourth quintiles) as a 
percentage of national income.  Robust standard errors appear below the coefficients.  *** indicates significance at the .01 level, ** significance at the .05 level, and * significance at the .10 level. Table 9.  Instrumented Political Instability
Independent Variable
Instrumented SPI Index -0.773 * -0.971 *** -0.902 * -0.983 ** -1.435 ** -0.015 **
[0.398] [0.374] [0.466] [0.471] [0.588] [0.006]
French Civil Law -40.135 ** -29.776 * -40.184 ** -22.915 -22.272 -0.169
[17.391] [15.716] [17.144] [18.293] [21.225] [0.186]
Common Law -44.714 ** -35.317 ** -45.540 *** -28.180 -7.285 0.004
[18.151] [15.069] [16.567] [18.846] [22.751] [0.204]
Scandinavian Civil Law -43.932 ** -27.440 * -38.796 ** -34.065 * -27.084 -0.260
[17.557] [15.111] [16.775] [18.397] [20.693] [0.179]
Constructed Trade Share -0.243 -0.433 *** -0.399 ** -0.091 -1.045 *** -0.009 **
[0.275] [0.154] [0.196] [0.300] [0.396] [0.004]
Log GDP Per Capita 7.271 *** 6.191 *** 7.450 *** 8.066 *** 9.460 *** 0.089 ***
[2.251] [2.055] [2.073] [2.178] [2.689] [0.028]
Obs 44 44 47 51 35 36
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.597 0.590 0.608 0.495 0.461 0.406
Year of Data
Coefficient t-statistic Obs p value R-squared
Average of 1999-2003 0.147*** 3.25 Yes 30 0.001 0.335
Average of 1999-2004 Bank Credit/GDP 12.072*** 3.93 Yes 30 0.000 0.645
We used the “estat overid” command in STATA after running two-stage least squares models through Panels A and Bo f Table 9. In the first model of Panel A, the resulting chi-square is 10.2252 (p =
0.2496). In the second model of Panel A, the result chi-square is 5.70686 (p = 0.6800). In the third model of Panel A, the resulting chi-square is 7.35047 (p = 0.4993). In the fourth model of Panel A, the
resulting chi-square is 4.01532 (p = 0.8557). In the fifth model of Panel A, the resulting chi-square is 7.49792 (p = 0.4840). In the sixth model of Panel A, the result chi-square is 5.99024 (p = 0.6483). In
Model 1 of Panel B, the resulting chi-square is 8.60226 (p = 0.3770). In Model 2 of Panel B, the resulting chi-square is 6.37901 (p = 0.6049). Hence, the null assumption of valid instruments cannot be
rejected by this test. 
Stock Market 
Capitalization/GDP from Beck 
et al.
Using Instrumental Variables 
from Column (6) of Table 8 to 
Predict Perceived Political 
Stability
Using the “estat firststage” command in STATA, we find that the instruments are particularly strong for explaining the stock market development results in Model 5 of Panel A (F-statistic = 17.70; p = 0.000);
Model 6 of Panel A (F-statistic of 16.67; p = 0.000); and Model 1 of Panel B (F-statistic of 105.40; p = 0.000); and the debt market development results in Model 2 of Panel B (130.86; p = 0.000). The first-
stage F-statistics for the earlier Model 1-4 of Panel are somewhat weaker: the R
2 in the first stage for those models is relatively high (greater than 0.46), but the F statistics do not surpass the usual rule of
thumb of 10. Finally, the results of the post-estimation “estat endogenous” tests in STATA for every model of Table 9 suggest that political instability can in fact be treated as largely exogenous. Only in
Models 5 and 6 of Panel A are the p values for the robust score chi-square below 0.10, and even in those two models the p values are not less than 0.05. In all other models the p values are between 0.26 and
0.91.  
Panel A.  In this table we present a two-stage least squares models with the instruments for political instability from Model 6 of Table 8.  The financial development outcomes are the dependent variables  and the 
instrumented political instability index (again, using Model 6 of Table 8), legal origin dummies, constructed trade share, and log GDP per capita are the independent variables.  For the first model, where we look at 
multiple years of financial development, we control for the start-of-period (Year 1965) Log of GDP per capita.  Robust standard errors appear below the coefficients.  *** indicates significance at the .01 level, ** 
significance at the .05 level, and * significance at the .10 level. 
Dependent Variable Used
Other Control Variables 
(legal origin dummies, 
constructed trade share, 
and log GDP per capita) 
included
Panel B. In this table we present a two-stage least squares models with the instruments for political instability from Model 6 of Table 8. The financial development outcomes are the
dependent variables and the instrumented IMD Perceived Political Stability Index (again, using instruments from Model 6 of Table 8), legal origin dummies, constructed trade share, and
start-of-period log GDP per capita serve as the independent variables. Robust standard errors appear below the coefficients. *** indicates significance at the .01 level, ** significance at
the .05 level, and * significance at the .10 level. For the IMD index, higher values indicates higher perceived political stability; hence higher perceived stability should be positively
associated with stronger financial development, as it is, at the .01 level.
DV: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Levine's Stock Market 
Capitalization/GDP for Year 
1988
DV: Average of Bank 
Loans/GDP for Years 1965-
1982
DV: Bank Loans/GDP for 
Year 1970
DV: Bank Loans/GDP for 
Year 1975
DV: Stock Market 
Capitalization/GDP for Year 
1988 
DV: Bank Loans/GDP for 
Year 1965ARG
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Figure 1.  Financial Development and Political Instability, Basic Relationship without Controls.  
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Figure 2.  Possible Channels to Financial Backwardness. 
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Figure 3.  Interactions Between Political Instability and Institutional Quality. 
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Figure 4:  Global Trends in Violent Conflict, 1946-2004. 
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Figure 5:  Incidence and Prevalence of Political Instability 
Worldwide, 1955-2003. 
 
 
  
 
Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark 
Woodward, A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability, paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of 
American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1-4, 2005.  Reproduced with permission. 
 
 
 
 
 